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ABSTRACT

US rhetoric has not matched reality in the free trade or
sustainability contexts, as may be seen by the ongoing debates
surroundinga range of behaviors that violate internationaltrade rules.
The US government's failure to adhere to the rules that it was
instrumentalin crafting sets a particularlytroublingprecedent. These
trade distortions reduce trust and respect among countries and
undermine efforts to combat climate change. Simultaneously, we are
witnessing a growing preference for "minilateral"agreements, as may
be seen in the Obama Administration's push for the Trans-Pacific
Partnershipand US-EU Trade Pact. This trend is likely to continue as
Donald Trump has signaled his intention to move away from
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multilateral trade deals and favor bilateral accords. The Chinese
government has pursued a similar approach in the context of financial
governance and, with its recent creation of the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, has also exhibited a willingness to circumvent
existing global institutions.
Concurrently, the international
community has been engaged in negotiations under the umbrella of the
United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change to
mitigate the threat of global climate change and similarly promote
sustainability, most recently via the ParisAgreement.
This Article identifies a series of inconsistencies in US trade
policies and completes a comparative case study of the ongoing
disputes between China and the United States surrounding solar
energy subsidies in hopes of finding opportunitiesfor collective action
that promotes both free trade and sustainability. It also pinpoints
roadblocks to promoting both the free trade and sustainability
movements, and through the lens of the literature on polycentric
governance, discusses the trend towards-as well as the benefits and
drawbacks of-minilateral and multilateral approaches to furthering
sustainable development.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In late November 2015, Paris hosted one of the largest
gatherings of world leaders in history.' Leaders were engaged in a
multinational effort to mitigate the worst consequences of climate
change. 2 Simultaneously, around the globe in Beijing, pollution
3
Monitoring sites recorded
reached its worst level of the year.
pollutants filling the air at levels twenty times higher than considered
4
safe by the World Health Organization. By the end of the 2015 Paris
session, a "red alert" came into effect, resulting in Chinese schools
5
This episode
shutting down and outdoor construction stopping.
of China's
process
fang)
(kai
up
opening
highlights the fact that the
taken a
have
trade borders and its integration into global markets
6
substantial toll on the environment.

See Coral Davenport & Gardiner Harris, Citing Urgency, World Leaders Converge on
1.
2015),
30,
(Nov.
TIMES
N.Y.
Talks,
Climate
for
France
2
1.html
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/01/worldleurope/obama-climate-conference-cop
[https://perma.ccNDM7-CKX9].
See id.
2.
Umberto Bacchi, COP21: Beijing Chokes in Hazardous Pollution as President Xi
3.
Attends Paris Climate Summit, INT'L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2015, 4:44 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/cop21-beijing-chokes-hazardous-pollution-president-xi-attends-parisclimate-summit-1531160 [https://perma.cc/53KL-S59C].
Id.
4.
China Pollution: First Ever Red Alert in Effect in Beijing, BBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2015),
5.
2 63 63
3
[https://perma.cc/468E-9KVW].
http://www.bbc.comlnews/world-asia-china- 50
Integration with the World: Development
China's
Wang,
Yan
&
See Justin Yifu Lin
6.
as a Process of Learning and Industrial Upgrading 12-13 (World Bank, Policy Research
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org
2008),
4799,
No.
Paper
Working
[https://perma.cc/8GDP/bitstream/handle/10986/6336/WPS4799.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
LYAZ]. In his speech on the opening day of the Paris talks, Chinese President H.E. Xi Jinping
stated that China learned its lesson from its hyper-quick economic development, and it is now
vigorously making ecological endeavors to promote green, circular, and low-carbon growth. H.E.

Xi Jinping, President, China, Speech at the Opening Ceremony of The Paris Conference on
2015),
30,
(Nov.
Change
Climate
20
15http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/XiattendsPariselimateconference/
12/01/content_22592469.htm [https://perma.cc/3KZZ-RPJN].
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Fittingly, China and the United States-the world's greatest
economies and two largest emitters of greenhouse gases-were jointly
instrumental in brokering the landmark Paris Agreement, which
"commit[s] nearly every country to lowering planet-warming
greenhouse gas emissions to help stave off the most drastic effects of
climate change."7 The call and response of Beijing and Paris exposes
the complex intersection between global economic competitiveness and
the health of global ecosystems, particularly as it relates to free trade
and sustainable development. 8 As the International Centre for Trade
and Sustainable Development has noted, "[t]rade and sustainable
development are intricately linked" and, as such, "trade can play a
crucial role in countries' social and economic development."9
Similarly, "[a]s countries implement measures to address climate
change, links to trade are discernible," ranging from the dissemination
of climate friendly technologies to restrictions on the trade of emission
intensive goods. 10 Balancing the three dimensions of sustainabilityeconomic development, environmental protection, and societal
health-is
perhaps humanity's greatest twenty-first century
challenge.
Despite the euphoria surrounding the announcement of the
Paris Accord, "[t]he new deal will not, on its own, solve global
warming."" After decades of multilateral negotiations (under the
7.
Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec.
12,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/worldleurope/climate-change-accordparis.html?emc=edit-na 20151212&nlid=52536178&ref=cta&_r=0
[https://perma.ccfUZL8XB7E]. "In November 2014 in Beijing, Mr. Obama and Mr. Xi announced that they would jointly
pursue plans to cut domestic greenhouse gas emissions. That breakthrough announcement was
seen as paving the way to the Paris deal, in which nearly all the world's nations have jointly
announced similar plans." Id.
8.
The empirical phenomenon described by the environmental Kuznets Curve tells us
that various indicators of environmental degradation tend to get worse in step with modern
economic growth. BRUCE YANDLE,
ENVIRONMENTAL
KUZNETS

MAYA VIJAYARAGHAVAN
CURVE
1

& MADHUSUDAN BHATTARAI, THE
(2002),
http://home.cerge-

ei.cz/richmanova/UPCES%5CYandle2002EKC.pdf [https://perma.cc/H726-GKBS].
9.
INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. SUBMISSION, INFORMATION AND VIEWS
RELATING TO MODALITIES FOR THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF A WORK PROGRAMME AND POSSIBLE
FORUM ON RESPONSE MEASURES 1 (n.d.), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/smsn/ngo/343.pdf

[https://perma.cc/2GBC-LG9L].
10.
Id.
11.
Davenport, supranote 7.
At best, scientists . . . say, it will cut global greenhouse gas emissions by about half
enough as is necessary to stave off an increase in atmospheric temperatures of two
degrees Celsius or 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit. That is the point at which, scientific
studies have concluded, the world will be locked into a future of devastating
consequences, including rising sea levels, severe droughts and flooding, widespread
food and water shortages and more destructive storms.
Id.
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auspices of both the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)), world leaders
have yet to determine how best to preserve national economic
development and the environment, in part due to differing conceptions
of "sustainable development" around the world. 12 As a result, a
This
country's rhetoric often does not correspond with reality.
13
mismatch causes frustration and distrust among countries.
To date, US rhetoric in particular has not matched reality in
the free trade or sustainability contexts, in part because of the natural
tension between the three dimensions of sustainable development.
This may be seen in the recent disputes between the United States
14 Indeed, the US
and China-the "G2"-with regard to solar panels.
government seems to be repeating history as it continually fails to live
up to aspects of the international trade rules that it was so
instrumental in drafting.15 This does more than undermine US moral
authority as a leader and solver of global collective action problems
like climate change. Simultaneously, it may well induce China to
engage in similar behavior, threatening the ability of the G2 to jointly
guide the international community as it seeks to promote sustainable
development.16
As this Article posits, cooperation between China and the
United States is essential to achieving sustainable growth because the
traditional top-down, multinational regimes like the WTO and the
UNFCCC, standing alone, are not equipped to solve such global
Instead, a new conceptual framework-in this case,
problems.
polycentric governance-is required. Described as "a collective of

12.

See infra note 23 and accompanying text.

13.

For example, the United States tries to set an example by reducing demand for fossil

fuels at home, but US energy companies are exporting more coal than ever before, mostly to

countries with more lax environmental standards. Associated Press, Not in My Backyard: US
Sending Dirty Coal Abroad, DAILYMAIL.COM, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article[https://perma.cc/4UZ9-XX8P] (last
2704738/Not-backyard-US-sending-dirty-coal-abroad.htm1
updated July 27, 2014, 11:01 PM).
See China Pledges Further Support for Solar Industry, REUTERS (Jan. 4, 2014),
14.
http://uk.reuters.comlarticle/2014/01/04/uk-china-solar-idUKBREA0303520140104
[https://perma.ce/44XK-9ENB]; Dispute Settlement, United States-Countervailing Duty
Measures on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437 (Dec. 8, 2016),
3
[https://perma.cc/G2C3https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases-e/ds4 7_e.htm
SD7K] (last visited Feb. 14, 2017).
See, e.g., Robert J. Carbaugh, NAFTA and the U.S.-Mexican Trucking Dispute, 4 J.
15.
ECON. STUD. 1, 2 (2011); infra Part III.
GLOB.
INT'L &
DEV.,
SUSTAINABLE
Goals,
Development
Sustainable
e.g.,
See,
16.
30 0
[https://perma.cc/7NYG-S4RP] (last visited
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1
Feb. 14, 2017).
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partially overlapping and nonhierarchical regimes," 1 7 polycentric
governance envisions a marriage of diverse top-down and bottom-up
initiatives simultaneously addressing problems in the global
commons. Over the past decade, particularly as the WTO's Doha
Round has faltered, the world has transitioned toward this multisectoral approach as evidenced by the growing reliance on bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) and regional free trade agreements.18 The
United States has opted for these minilateral arrangements, as
suggested by the Obama Administration's push for the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) and the US-EU Trade Pact.1 9
The Chinese
government is pursuing a similar approach, especially in the context
of financial governance. 20
This minilateral wave is unlikely to replace umbrella
organizations like the UNFCCC and WTO in the quest to mitigate the
threat of global climate change and promote sustainability. Instead,
the top-down multilaterals are likely to work in concert with emerging
bottom-up minilaterals. This Article argues that such a polycentric
approach is needed to promote both free trade and sustainability, but
that in so doing, stakeholders-including the G2-need to address
latent problems in their own policymaking to strengthen the
international trade law enforcement regime that is vital to the
creation of a level, global playing field. This Article identifies a series
of inconsistencies in US trade policies and completes a comparative
case study of the ongoing disputes between China and the United
States surrounding solar energy subsidies in hopes of finding
opportunities for collective action that promotes both free trade and
sustainability. It also pinpoints roadblocks to promoting both the free
trade and sustainability movements and, through the lens of the
literature on polycentric governance, discusses the trend towards-as

17.
Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources,
58 INT'L ORG. 277, 277 (2004).
18.
Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto
Multilateral Agreement, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 304, 305 (2009) ("As a result of the failure of
multilateral negotiations, the number of bilateral investment treaties ("BITs"), free trade
agreements ("FTAs"), and regional trade agreements that include investment provisions has
increased dramatically.").
19.
See Joe Schatz, Obama: U.S.-EU Trade Pact Possible in 2016, but Not Congressional
Approval, POLITICO (Apr. 24, 2016, 11:48 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/04/obamatransatlantic-trade-deal-possible-in-2016-but-not-congressional-approval-222367
[https://perma.cc/NGS8-BFT7].
20.
See Tammy Bender, China's Financial 'Minilateralism? A Boost or Threat to
Traditional Multilateralism?, CIGI (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.cigionline.org/articles/chinasfinancial- minilateralism-boost-or-threat-traditional-multilateralism
[https://perma.cc/KPX5S4AU].
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well as the benefits and drawbacks of-minilateral and multilateral
approaches to furthering sustainable development.
The Article is structured as follows. Part I introduces the
concept of sustainable development in international law and traces
past and present efforts to combat climate change. Part II describes
the extent to which polycentric governance offers a useful, effective
path to promote both free trade and environmental protection. Part
III examines inconsistencies in past and current US behavior,
particularly as they relate to global trade and the environment, in
order to illustrate how they threaten coordinated action by the G2.
Part IV reviews Chinese trade policy in an attempt to demonstrate the
opportunities for, and threats to, Chinese and American cooperation.
Finally, Part V presents a comparative solar panel case study in order
to illustrate the hurdles that must be overcome in the quest for
successful minilateral action by the United States and China.
II. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE
This Part briefly introduces the concept of sustainable
development in international law. It then reviews the history of
climate change negotiations, followed by a brief discussion of the 2015
Paris Agreement. Each section places a special emphasis on the
importance of G2 leadership to the success of efforts to address the
threat of climate change.
A. Defining Sustainable Development
Sustainable development 21 is defined in the UN Brundtland
Report as "development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs." 22 The term is used in numerous contexts, often with varying
23 It is included in
meanings in the developed and developing worlds.
such far-flung agreements as the 1946 International Convention for
"On the surface, there is little difference between sustainable development and
21.
sustainability. . . ." Sustainability and Sustainable Development Guide, CIRCULAR ECOLOGY,
http://www.circularecology.comlintroduction-to-sustainability-guide.html#.WKN9UBCgQxV
[https://perma.cc7YJM-MS5U]. The subtle difference is best illustrated by the quote
"Sustainable development is the pathway to sustainability." Id.
World Comm'n on Env't and Dev., Our Common Future, ch. 2 1 1, U.N. Doc.
22.
A/42/427, annex (1987); see also Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 78
(Sept. 25) (defining sustainable development as "[the] need to reconcile economic development
with protection of the environment").
23.
ANALYSIS

See, e.g., JOHN PEZZEY, SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT CONCEPTS: AN ECONOMIC

55-62 (1992); What Is Sustainable Development?, IISD,
[https://perma.cclW78N-WSQQ] (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).

http://www.iisd.org/sd/
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the Regulation of Whaling and the 1983 International Tropical Timber
Agreement. 24
Some commentators even regard sustainable
development as having generated a discrete area of international law,
consisting of "a corpus of international legal principles and treaties,"
which merge with international commercial and environmental law. 25
Indeed, since the 1980s, the international legal community has
attempted to create a single conceptual framework for sustainable
development. 26 Yet results so far have been "mixed, both in terms of
conceptual clarity and programmatic success." 27 Some transparency,
though, can be seen in reference to the five principal aims derived
from the International Law Association's (ILA) New Delhi Declaration
on Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable
Development.
These
include: integrated
policy assessment,
environmental sustainability,
intergenerational
equity, robust
political participation, and intergenerational responsibility. 2 8 These
principles were designed to integrate international environmental
law, human rights law, and development within the rubric of
sustainable development. 29 More broadly, the principles echo the core
elements of the Common Heritage of Mankind concept, 30 along with
the three pillars of the sustainable development movement, namely
economic development, social development, and environmental
protection. 3 1
However, the three pillars of sustainable development, also
known as triple-bottom-line accounting or the "3Ps" (people, planet,
profit) alternatively, are far from universal, as can be seen by
24.

PETER H. SAND,

LESSONS LEARNED IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE

8

&

(1990).
25.
See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global
Governance, 83 TEx. L. REV. 2109, 2115 (2005) (citing MARIE-CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER
ASHFAQ KHALFAN, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND PROSPECTS,

268 (2004)).
26.
See id.
27.
See id.
28.
See Int'l Law Ass'n, New Delhi Declaration on Principles of International Law
Relating
to
Sustainable
Development,
Part
IV
(n.d.),
http://cisdl.org/public/does/new-delhi-declaration.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XZG-T2JN] [hereinafter
New Delhi ILA]; see also Reed D. Benson, Recommendations for an Environmentally Sound
Policy on Western Water, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 255 (1998). See generally Nico Schrijver, ILA
New Delhi Declarationof Principles of InternationalLaw Relating to Sustainable Development,
49 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 299 (2002).
29.
Id.
30.
See KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw xix-xx (1998) (describing the history of international efforts to bring the
seabed, ocean floor, and outer space resources, such as the moon, within the CHM).
31.
Jaye Ellis, Sustainable Development as a Legal Principle:A RhetoricalAnalysis, in 2
SELECT PROC. EUR. SOC'Y INT'L L. 641, 644 (2008).
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divergent state practices on the subject. 32 For example, in the US
context, sometimes the three pillars of sustainable development are
granted equal attention, as seen in the rise of holistic sustainability
reporting and benefit corporations, while at other times, there is more
33
focus on environmental protection than economic development.
Conversely, in China, as with many emerging markets, the focus has
long been on enhancing economic sustainability, primarily through
rapid economic growth fueled by high levels of public investment,
among other things. 34 Though there are some signs that, at least in
China, perceptions are shifting toward a more balanced vision of
sustainable development, this spectrum of approaches to such an
important topic as free trade is emblematic of the difficulties involved
with pursuing multilateral consensus. 35 For our purposes, when we
refer to sustainable development we are referring to economic growth
made more environmentally sensitive in order to raise living
36
standards and avoid environmental degradation.
The lack of consensus about sustainable development has long
stalled both global free trade and sustainability progress. This has
been evidenced by the latency of the WTO's Doha Round, as well as a
series of difficult climate summits, including the 2009 UNFCCC
Copenhagen Accord.37 And, while the 2015 Paris Agreement is
generally recognized as a success, it has yet to be seen whether China
and the United States will actually take the largely voluntary steps
necessary to transition toward a low-carbon and climate-resilient

32.

See,

e.g.,

TRIPLE

About,

BoIrrOM-LINE,

http://www.tbl.com.pk/about/

[https://perma.cc/3VV4-86YE] (last visited Feb. 14, 2017).
See, e.g., Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President on
33.
General Assembly Hall (Sept. 27, 2015),
Sustainable Development Goals, U.N.
2
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/ 015/09/27/remarks-presidentsustainable-development-goals [https://perma.cclDA29-7HMB].
See, e.g., Stephanie Beyer, Environmental Law and Policy in the People's Republic
34.
(2006),
210
185,
L.
INT'L
J.
CHINESE
5
China,
of
http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/1/185.full [https://perma.cc/G96N-YEDV].
See, e.g., China Air Pollution Season Kicks Off with a Cough and a Wheeze as Coal
35.
10:47 AM),
2013,
21,
(Oct.
NEWS
Plants Turn on for the Winter, CBS
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57608393/china-air-pollution-season-kicks-off-with-acough-and-a-wheeze-as-coal-plants-turn-on-for-the-winter/ [https://perma.cc/H7PQ-7MMK].
36.

JOHN

DREXHAGE

&

DEBORAH

MURPHY,

SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT:

FROM BRUNDTLAND TO RIO 2012, Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. 10 (Sept. 19,
http://www.surdurulebilirkalkinma.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Background
2010),
on-SustainableDevelopment.pdf [https://perma.cc/2R9R-GCCT].
See Chalamish, supra note 18, at 305; Key Powers Reach Compromise at Climate
37.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hileurope/8421935.stm
2009),
19,
(Dec.
BBC NEWS
Summit,
[https://perma.cc/X2NR-SH89].
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future at all levels, especially when those steps threaten national selfinterest. 38
B. Climate Change Negotiations
It is beyond the scope of this Article to summarize the long and,
at times, convoluted history of climate change negotiations. 39 Rather,
the point here is merely to juxtapose the bottom-up approaches to
trade and sustainable development with the multilateral, top-down
approach favored throughout much of the history of the UNFCCC and
WTO processes.
In brief, the UNFCCC was born during the 1992 Earth
Summit. 4 0
Its objective is to "stabiliz[e] . . . greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system." 41 The
broad agreement necessary to effectuate such an ambitious, global
goal meant that the 154 nations that originally signed onto the
UNFCCC agreed only to a voluntary, non-binding aim of reducing
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations to 1990 levels by 2000, a
goal that many countries did not meet. 42 In other words, it was an
agreement to agree, which would be filled out through annual
conference-of-the-parties (COP) gatherings that have taken place since
the 1995 COP1 in Berlin and extending twenty years on to COP21 in
Paris in December 2015.43 There were high and low points during
these COPs that are summarized for easy reference in Figure 1. Two
stand-out COPs were COP3, at which time the Kyoto Protocol was
38.
Clifford Krauss & Diane Cardwell, Climate Deal's First Big Hurdle: The Draw of
Cheap Oil, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/business
/energy-environment/climate-deals-first-big-hurdle-the-draw-of-cheap-oil.html?emc=edit
th
.20160126&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=52536178&-r=0
[https://perma.cc/9VQG-KJB6]. Falling
oil prices threaten to undermine US and Chinese pledges to curb the use of fossil fuels. See id.
Thus far, however, the leadership in both countries has not wavered. See id.
39.
For such a concise history, see Scott J. Shackelford, On Climate Change and Cyber
Attacks: Levering PolycentricGovernance to Mitigate Global Collective Action Problems, 18 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 653, 666-79 (2016).
40.
See UN
Conference on Environment and Development (1992),
U.N.,
http://www.un.org/geninfofbp/enviro.html [https://perma.cc/C24X-GAKA] (last visited Feb. 15,
2017).
41.
See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, opened for signature
May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849, 854 (1992) [hereinafter UNFCCC]; DONALD A. BROWN, CLIMATE
CHANGE ETHICS: NAVIGATING THE PERFECT MORAL STORM 138 (2013).

42.
Protocol,

UNFCCC, supra note 41, art. 2; Shackelford, supra note 39, at 670; History of Kyoto
CTR.

CLIMATE

&

ENERGY

http://www.c2es.org/international/negotiations/kyoto-protocol/history
4YFRI (last visited Feb. 15, 2017).
43.
Shackelford, supra note 39.

SOLUTIONS,

[https://perma.cc/9PYS-
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adopted during the United States' "unipolar moment," 4 4 and COP15,
representing a low point in global climate governance with the
disappointing 2009 Copenhagen Accord.45
The Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force on February 16,
2005, when fifty-five nations had ratified it,46 has been successful, at
least in terms of participation; 191 nations have ratified the
agreement as of September 2015, though several large emitters,
including the United States, Australia, and Canada (which ratified the
47
agreement but subsequently pulled out) remain outside the system.
Though far from perfect-Kyoto's Clean Development Mechanism has
often been criticized 4 8 -the Protocol does demonstrate the ability of
the UNFCCC process to get results. Less praise is generally offered to
COPl5, which occurred more than a decade later in Copenhagen and
featured political discord, such as that experienced between the
49
BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) and other
power centers, including the United States, the European Union, and
the G77.50 Though an agreement featuring voluntary emissions.
See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, Excerpt: Zakaria's 'The Post-American World,' NEWSWEEK
44.
8 96 4
5
http://www.newsweek.comlexcerpt-zakarias-post-american-world2008),
3,
(May
[https://perma.cc/3VBQ-FHU9] (suggesting that the United States no longer dominates in many
areas seen to denote global power). But see Richard N. Haass, The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will
Follow

(May/June
nonpolarity

US

Dominance,

FOREIGN

AFF.

03
/agehttps://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2008-052008),
"a
nonpolar
of
emergence
the
for
(arguing
[https://perma.cc/73NH-PPE5]

international system . . . characterized by numerous centers with meaningful power").

See David Adam, From Kyoto to Copenhagen, WASH. MONTHLY (July/Aug. 2009),
45.
2
2
https://www.unz.org/PublWashingtonMonthly-2009jul- gOOOl [https://perma.cc/M2ZV-EV44].
See Kyoto Protocol Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/26/world/kyoto46.
protocol-fast-facts/ [https://perma.cclYXG5-LKZS] (last updated Mar. 31, 2015, 1:12 PM).
See Shackelford, supra note 39, at 672 (mentioning the United States, Canada, and
47.
Australia as emitters); see also id. (mentioning the United States and Canada as emitters).
See, e.g., Michael W. Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism's
48.
Performanceand Potential, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1759 (2008).
Also known as the BRICS, this group is not only "an economic concept but
49.
increasingly . . . is also taking the form of a political entity." Haibin Niu, A Chinese Perspective
COUNCIL COUNCILS (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.cfr.org
on the BRICS in 2015,
2
/councilofcouncils/global-memos/p36088%20?cid=nc-npbnews- 015_national-conference
2
confirmation and-background-link48-2015060 &sp-mid=48790069&sprid=a3plZ3VyYUBjZn
lub3JnSO [https://perma.cc/A4ZC-5L6W].
See Key Powers Reach Compromise at Climate Summit, supra note 37; see also About
50.
the Group of 77, GROUP 77 U.N., http://www.g77.org/doc/ [https://perma.cc/XSN2-ZPLP] (last
visited Feb. 15, 2017).
The Group of 77 is the largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries
in the United Nations, which provides the means for the countries of the South to
articulate and promote their collective economic interests and enhance their joint
negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues within the United
Nations system, and promote South-South cooperation for development.
Id.
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pledges was reached, it did not really satisfy anyone. 51 Still, the
struggle to reach agreement across such an array of stakeholders and
interests did lead to the development of more targeted forums, both in
terms of membership and subject matter, in what could be considered
a shift toward a polycentric approach to atmospheric management.52
This is manifest by the Paris Agreement's reliance on national
voluntary pledges to reach its climate change mitigation goals. 53

51.
See Rhys Gerholdt, Copenhagen Accord Weekly Roundup: April 28, Climate Action,
U.S. CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK (Apr. 28, 2010), http://blog.usclimatenetwork.org/climatenegotiations/copenhagen-accord-weekly-roundup-april-28/
[https://perma.cc/W85E-KTXG]; see
also Roger Harrabin, UN Climate Talks Extend Kyoto Protocol, Promise Compensation, BBC
(Dec.
8,
2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-20653018
[https://perma.cc/C7PQ-M83D] (noting that the Russian delegation tried to slow progress at
COP18 but ultimately their objections were put down by the Chairman); Matt McGrath, LastMinute
Deal Saves
Fractious UN
Climate
Talks,
BBC
(Nov.
23,
2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-25067180 [https://perma.cc/J6DP-DT5X].
52.
See Daniel H. Cole, From Global to Polycentric Climate Governance, 2 CLIMATE L.
395, 395 (2011) (discussing the potential of polycentric governance to better address climate
change given the failures of multilateral efforts); see also Dave Keating, Climate Action Goes
National,
POLITICO
EUR.
EDITION
(Nov.
28,
2013),
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/climate-action-goes-national/78871.aspx
[https://perma.cc/X5GN-UA4X] ("After the dramatic collapse of the Copenhagen summit in 2009,
there has been a retreat from the idea that climate change is going to be fought through
international action. The emphasis has shifted to 'voluntary national measures' loosely coordinated at the UN level.").
53.
See, e.g., Cameron McKenna, Paris, Big Oil and Climate Change, LEXOLOGY (Jan.
15, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/1ibrary/detail.aspx?g-1ba42205-fc8a-41lc-94da-d61acc409948
[https://perma.cc/BS9R-T4XE]. The voluntary nature of the commitments "was explicitly
designed in response to the political reality in the United States. A deal that would have
assigned legal requirements for countries to cut emissions at specific levels would need to go
before the United States Senate for ratification. That language would have been dead on arrival
in the Republican-controlled Senate, where many members question the established science of
human-caused climate change, and still more wish to thwart Mr. Obama's climate change
agenda." Davenport, supra note 7.
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FIGURE 1: KEY DATES IN UNFCCC PROCESS

54

Event

Year
2015

COP21 Paris Agreement signed-the first global, legally
binding commitment to curb greenhouse gas emissions.

2014

COP20 witnessed new pledges for the Green Climate Fund

2013

COP19/CMP9 adopted initiatives including the Durban
Platform, the Green Climate Fund and Long-Term Finance,
the Warsaw Framework for REDD Plus, and the Warsaw
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage.

2012

Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol adopted.

2011

Durban Platform for Enhanced Action drafted and
accepted by the COP at COPl7.

2010

Cancun Agreements drafted and largely accepted by the
COP at COP16.

2009

Copenhagen Accord drafted at COP15 with countries later
submitting emissions reductions pledges.

2005

Kyoto Protocol went into force.

2001

Marrakesh Accords adopted at COP7, "detailing rules for
implementation of Kyoto Protocol, setting up new funding
and planning instruments for adaptation, and establishing a
technology transfer framework."

1997

Kyoto Protocol formally adopted at COP3.

1995

COP1 took place in Berlin.

1992

UNFCCC was born during Earth Summit

1990

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's
Assessment Report released.

First

Background on the UNFCCC: The InternationalResponse to Climate Change, U.N.
54.
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential-background
litems/6031.php [https://perma.cc/EL87-Z4TA] (last visited Feb. 15, 2017); see also Shackelford,
supra note 39, at 675-76. For a more comprehensive timeline of the development of global
climate change

law and policy,

GOVERNANCE passim (2014).

see JOYEETA GUPTA, THE HISTORY

OF GLOBAL CLIMATE
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1. The Paris Agreement
The successful negotiation of the Paris Agreement (L'accord de
Paris) in December 2015 offers hope for multilateral cooperation in
combatting global warming. Several aspects of the agreement are
telling. First, it was the product of the efforts of 195 nations.5 5
Second, it requires action in some form from every country, rich or
poor, including China.5 6 While the deal by itself will not solve climate
change, it provides a framework for effective action and thus is a
cause for optimism. For instance, "the deal could be viewed as a
signal to global financial and energy markets, triggering a
fundamental shift away from investment in coal, oil, and gas as
primary energy sources toward zero-carbon energy sources like wind,
solar, and nuclear power."57 Perhaps of greatest importance is the fact

that the United States and China-the two largest greenhouse gas
emitters-were
instrumental in achieving global consensus,
demonstrating the critical role played by minilateralism in furthering
multilateral ends.5 8

55.

See

Paris

Agreement,

EUR.

COMMISSION,

http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/paris-en
[https://perma.cclW3HYW6F5] (last visited Feb. 15, 2017).
56.
Davenport, supra note 7. "Traditionally, such pacts have required developed
economies like the United States to take action to lower greenhouse gas emissions, but they have
exempted developing countries like China and India from such obligations." Id. Not all would
agree that this is good thing. Id.
Poorer countries had pushed for a legally binding provision requiring that rich
countries appropriate a minimum of at least $100 billion a year to help them mitigate
and adapt to the ravages of climate change. In the final deal, that $100 billion figure
appears only in a preamble, not in the legally binding portion of the agreement.
Id.; cf. Matthew Dalton & Syed Zain Al-Mahmood, Rich, Poor Nations Tussle over Funds for
Environment, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2015, at All (reporting that poor nations complain of too
much red tape when trying to access funds for the emergencies resulting from global warming);
Bjorn Lomborg, This Child Doesn't Need a Solar Panel, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/this-child-doesnt-need-a-solar-panel-1445466967
[https://perma.cc/F9BV-HCNY] (arguing that funding commitments to climate change are
reducing resources available for more pressing problems like health care in poorer nations).
57.
Davenport, supra note 7. Prior to the Paris meetings, the economic performance of
green companies in the stock market has been a bust. Matt Krantz, Investors Share Climate
Burden, PRESSREADER
(Dec.
1,
2015),
http://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-arizonarepublic/20151201/282144995268530.
58.
Davenport, supra note 7. 'The two leaders met ... just three months prior to the
Paris meeting and strengthened their earlier pledges to take 'parallel steps to address climate
change."' William Mauldin & Colleen McCain Nelson, Obama, Xi Advance Climate Deal, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 16, 2015, at A10. 'The U.S. pledged last year to reduce carbon-dioxide emissions by
between 26% and 28% by 2025, compared with 2005 levels, while China said it would make sure
its emissions peak by 2030 or earlier." Id.
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Under the terms of the Paris Agreement, countries must pledge
to cut carbon emissions. In addition, they promise to meet every five
years to publicly report on their actual performance. Thus, under the
terms of the Paris Agreement, countries must pledge to cut carbon
emissions. In addition, they promise to "report what they are doing,
as well as publicly put forth updated plans, . . . designed to create a

'name-and-shame' system of global peer pressure, in hopes that
59
countries will not want to be seen as international laggards." While
all of this sounds good in theory, the real test will be whether the
individual nations and their future leaders will actually follow
through. 60
But for the deal to mean anything, they said, the celebratory moment must give
way immediately to an era in which intensive efforts are made to squeeze
emissions out of the world economy. That task will fall largely to businesses and
investors, operating under emissions-reduction policies that countries have pledged
to put into effect by 2020.61

However, businesses and their managers respond best to
market-based incentives or disincentives. Thus, some painful choices
must be made. After all, despite the fact that scientists claim "that
industrial emissions of greenhouse gases [must] come to an end by
roughly 2050,"62 the private sector is still building coal-burning power
plants and "fossil-fuel companies are spending hundreds of billions a
year looking for new reserves that cannot be burned if . .. [that] target
is to be met." 6 3 Still, there is hope. For instance, green technology
("greentech") firms are leading the charge into a more sustainable
twenty-first century. They joined the Obama Administration in what
See Davenport, supra note 7.
59.
Its success "depends heavily on the views of the future world leaders who will carry
60.
In the United States, every Republican candidate running for president in
policies.
those
out
2016 has publicly questioned or denied the science of climate change, and has voiced opposition
to Mr. Obama's climate change policies." Id.
Justin Gillis, Paris Climate Pact a Step, if Not a Cure, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2015),
61.
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/science/earth/climate-accord-is-a-healing-step-if-not-acure.html [https://perma.ccl3PDD-6F42].
Id.
62.
In China, . . . the government implemented a new rule that no matter how low world
crude oil prices may fall, the price of gasoline and diesel will continue to be set as
though the world price of oil were still $40 a barrel. The goal is to prevent gasoline
and diesel from becoming so cheap that China's citizens would start consuming it
indiscriminately. . . . China's heavily state-owned refining industry will also not be
allowed to keep the extra profits from buying crude oil cheaply and selling gasoline
and diesel as though the crude oil still cost $40 a barrel. Instead, the Chinese
government will take the extra refining profit margin and put the money into a
special fund for energy conservation and pollution control.
Krauss & Cardwell, supra note 38.
Gillis, supra note 61.
63.
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could be considered a polycentric push toward a more equitable
climate regime. 64 Even the election of Donald Trump, who has
signaled his intention to pull the United States out of the Paris
Agreement (a decision that would require four years to come into
force), cannot forestall global action on the issue, though it could
curtail US government support for research and greentech
incentives. 65
Drawing from the extensive literature on polycentric
governance, this Part examines the feasibility and desirability of
combining bottom-up, multi-sector approaches to sustainable trade
with the more traditional top-down management structures of the
WTO and UNFCCC. This includes a discussion of the elements
necessary for a successful polycentric approach to the climate change
problem.
C. A Polycentric Grounding
In one of her last papers, Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom argued
that single policies adopted only on a global scale are unlikely to
garner sufficient trust among stakeholders to successfully combat the
effects of climate change.6 6 Instead, she argued that a polycentric
approach is necessary. 67 According to Professor Michael McGinnis,
"[t]he basic idea [of polycentric governance] is that any group . .
facing some collective action problem should be able to address that
problem in whatever way they best see fit."68 This could include using
existing governance structures or crafting new systems. 69 In other
words, "[a] system of governance is fully polycentric if it facilitates
64.
See Katie Fehrenbacher, Big Tech Firms, Food Companies Commit to White House
Climate Change Pledge, FORTUNE (Oct. 19, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/10/19/white-houseclimate-pledge/ [https://perma.cc/753R-5N5R].
65.
See Coral Davenport, Diplomats Confront New Threat to Paris ClimatePact: Donald
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/us/politics/trumpclimate-change.html?_r=0
[https://perma.ce/52HG-8TWD];
President Trump Prepares to
Withdraw from GroundbreakingClimate Change Agreement, Transition Official Says, FORTUNE
(Jan. 30, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/30/donald-trump-paris-agreement-climate-changewithdraw/ [https://perma.cclKKU8-XR8Q].
66.
See generally Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate
Change
(World
Bank,
Policy
Research
Working
Paper
No.
5095,
2009),
http://www.iadb.org/intallintaledi/pe/2009/04268.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3A8-3vPP].
67.
This argument is built on the work of numerous scholars, including Professor
Andrew Murray's analysis of polycentric cyber regulation. See ANDREW W. MURRAY, THE
REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: CONTROL IN THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT 47-52 (2007).
68.
MICHAEL D. McGINNIS, COSTS AND CHALLENGES OF POLYCENTRIC GOVERNANCE: AN
EQUILIBRIUM
CONCEPT
AND
EXAMPLES
FROM
US
HEALTH
CARE
1
(2011),

http://php.indiana.edu/-mcginnis/Beijing-core.pdf [https://perma.cclU8EU-JUFX].
69.
Id. at 1-2.
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70
This multi-level, multicreative problem-solving at all levels."
71
challenges
purpose, multi-functional, and multi-sectoral model
72
and by
self-organization
of
benefits
the
demonstrating
by
orthodoxy
in
can,
control
private
and
examining the extent to which national
some cases, coexist with communal management. It also posits that,
due to the existence of free riders in a multipolar world, a single
government or unit is unable to manage global collective action
problems.73 Instead, a polycentric approach recognizes that diverse
organizations working at multiple levels can create different types of
74
Polycentric
policies that can increase cooperation and compliance.
regulation is not a simple response, but is a multifaceted one in
keeping with the complexity of the crises in trade and sustainable
development. It is through this lens that we view both the top-down
UNFCCC process, as well as the bottom-up, national and regional
approaches to trade and sustainability seen in the United States and
China case studies discussed subsequently.

1. Polycentric Governance Principles
Although polycentric processes seem to be increasingly favored
in both the trade and sustainable development contexts, the
implications of this movement or policymakers and managers alike
To help better understand the contours for
remains to be seen.
we now examine several of the design
systems,
successful polycentric
identified as essential for the
Ostrom
principles that Professor
management of common pool resources. This will, in turn, inform
potential obstacles to a Chinese/American-led effort to forestall
75
climate change.

70.

Id. at 3.

71.

Id. at 1 (defining polycentricity as "a system of governance in which authorities from

overlapping jurisdictions (or centers of authority) interact to determine the conditions under
which these authorities, as well as the citizens subject to these jurisdictional units, are
authorized to act as well as the constraints put upon their activities for public purposes").
Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems as One Approach for Solving Collective-Action
72.
Problems 2 (Ind. Univ. Workshop in Political Theory & Policy Analysis, Working Paper Series
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.eduldlclbitstream/handle/10535/4417WO82008),
08-6,
No.
6_OstromDLC.pdf?sequence=l [https://perma.cclM6S5-62HT].
See Ostrom, supra note 66, at 35.
73.
Robert 0. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9
74.
PERSP. ON POL. 7, 10 (2011); cf. Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and
Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137, 157 (2008)
(discussing the legitimacy of polycentric regimes and arguing that "[a]ll regulatory regimes are
polycentric to varying degrees").
See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
75.
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 212 (1990).
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A polycentric approach to sustainable trade demands "clearly
define[s] boundaries for the user pool . . . and the resource domain." 76
According to Professor Ostrom, "[t]he boundary rules relate to who can
enter, harvest, manage, and potentially exclude others' impacts. This
element is essential because participants require assurance about
trustworthiness and cooperation of the others involved."7 7 In other
words, this principle evokes the importance of setting the ground rules
for who can join a group or other collective effort to help guard against
free riding. While this may be seen in the growth of regional accords
that include a core group of invited participants, such as the TPP,
Chinese perception that such a free trade agreement is an "Anyone
but China" effort78 does not bode well for future China-US cooperation.
"Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs" 79
Professor Ostrom's second design principle-underscores the need for
equity in a system so that some of the "users [do not] get all the
benefits and pay few of the costs.80 Indeed, arguments about equitable
growth are at the center of disputes in the sustainable development
context, such as that which may be seen in the UNFCCC atmospheric
governance
debates
surrounding
common
but
differentiated
responsibilities.8 1 Similarly, in the trade context, equity frequently
comes into play, as seen in WTO proceedings allowing members to
prohibit dumping and other unfavorable trade practices. 82 Of course,
charges by China and other developing nations that the entire
dumping regime was little more than a "bait-and-switch" tactic
employed by the United StateS 83 only weakens US influence in
crafting enforceable agreements to curb greenhouse gases. Similarly,

76.

SUSAN J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION 32 (1998).

77.

Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems: Multilevel Governance Involving a Diversity of

Organizations, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMONS: ANALYTICAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES
IN BUILDING GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 105, 119 (Eric Brousseau et al. eds., 2012).

78.
See David Pilling, It Won't Be Easy to Build an 'Anyone but China' Club, FIN. TIMES
(May
22,
2013),
https://www.ft.com/content/08cf74f6-c216-1 1e2-8992-00144feab7de
[https://perma.cclHF8V-5EAB].
79.
Ostrom, supra note 66, at 13.
80.
Id.
81.
PIETER
PAUW
ET
AL.,
DIFFERENT
PERSPECTIVES
ON
DIFFERENTIATED
RESPONSIBILITIES: A STATE-OF-THE-ART REVIEW OF THE NOTION OF COMMON BUT
DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 22 (2014), https://www.die-

gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_6.2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZY3-D7G9].
82.
See, e.g., ERIC RICHARDS & SCOTT SHACKELFORD, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 161 (2014).

83.

See infra text accompanying note 149.
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charges of Chinese underreporting of its carbon output are equally
problematic. 84
Professor Ostrom's third design principle calls for "collective
choice arrangements . . . [that ensure] that the resource users
It insists "that most of the
participate in setting . . . rules."8 5
individuals affected by a resource regime are authorized to participate
in making and modifying the rules related to boundaries, assessment
of costs . . . etc." 86 This principle implies the importance of engaged
and proactive rulemaking by technical communities, the private
87
Such a "big tent" approach
sector, and the international community.
to policymaking is evident in the UNFCCC process, at least in terms
of participation, as illustrated by the some 2,400 NGOs that
participated in the 1992 Rio Summit and in many of the COPs held
since then. 8 Trade talks are, by necessity, closed to encourage frank
dialogue between the nations involved, but this also opens them up to
criticism from stakeholders that feel alienated by the process. The
United States and China, whether through the negotiation of a BIT or
any other minilateral arrangement, are cautioned to actively involve
all stakeholders. Precedent for this-at least after the formation of
the agreement-is evidenced in the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement
(KORUS), which instructs the trade partners to "seek appropriate
opportunities for the public to participate in the development and
89
implementation of cooperative environmental activities."
Trust, while important to the success of polycentric efforts to
address the global problems like climate change, will not guarantee
90
Eventually, some level of
the absence of rule-breaking behavior.
91
In self-organized communities,
active monitoring is also necessary.

Chris Buckley, China Burns Much More Coal Than Reported, Complicating Climate
84.
Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/04/worldasia/china-burnsmuch- more-coal-than-reported-complicating-climate-talks.html?emc=edit th20151104
&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=52536178&_r=0_[https://perma.cc/B4B9-KGCT] ("China ... has been
burning up to 17 percent more coal a year than the government previously disclosed, according to
newly released data.").
BUCK, supra note 76, at 32.
85.
Ostrom, supra note 77, at 120.
86.
See George J. Siedel & Helena Haapio, Law as a Source of Strategic Advantage:
87.
Using ProactiveLaw for Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 641, 656-57 (2010) (discussing
the origins of the proactive law movement, which may be considered "a future-oriented approach
to law placing an emphasis on legal knowledge to be applied before things go wrong").
See UN Conference on Environment and Development (1992), supra note 40.
88.
2007,
30,
June
20.6(4),
art.
Kor.-U.S.,
Agreement,
Trade
Free
89.
2
12719.pdf
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/ftalkorus/asset-upload-file85
[https://perma.cclBF6G-76ZS].
Ostrom, supra note 77, at 120.
90.
BUCK, supra note 76, at 32.
91.
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monitors are typically chosen among the members to ensure "the
conformance of others to local rules." 92 Robust monitoring is available
in the trade context through, for example, international arbitration,9 3
more so than in the sustainable development context, which, until
recently, has not been a high priority among business leaders. 94
Though there is a growing trend toward codifying a distinct field of
corporate social responsibility law that is largely supportive of
sustainable development, as may be seen by state and federal laws
around conflict minerals and sustainable supply chains as well as
sustainability initiatives from stock exchanges to require holistic
reporting, 95 on balance, enforcement action remains relatively more
rare.
KORUS again provides a rough guide for future efforts to
include a monitoring mechanism in a minilateral agreement, calling
for the establishment of an Environmental Affairs Council which will
meet annually to oversee the implementation of the parties'
obligations regarding environmental protection. 96
Effective conflict resolution mechanisms are also important to
a polycentric approach to global problems. That is, they should be
"readily available, low cost and legitimate," 97 and, ideally, should
incorporate "graduated sanctions." 98 This latter point underscores
Professor Ostrom's caution not to allow "an infraction [to] pass
unnoticed" 9 9-the cost of flouting agreed upon rules should be met
with penalties that increase over time and with each occurrence.
Currently, there is relatively little evidence that this design principle
is playing out in the trade or sustainable development context, though
it should be noted that reservations, at least, are not allowed in any of
the "big three" climate agreements surveyed, including the Montreal

92.

Ostrom, supra note 77, at 121.

93.

For more on this topic, see RICHARDS & SHACKELFORD, supra note 82, at 159.

94.
See Scott J. Shackelford & Ashley Walter, Our Mini-Theme: Corporate Social
Responsibility Is Now Legal, Bus. L. TODAY, http://www.americanbar.org/publications
/blt/2015/01/intro.html [https://perma.cc/BW2C-U4GA] (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
95.

See

About

GRI,

GLOBAL

REPORTING

INITIATIVE,

https://www.globalreporting.org/Information/about-grilPages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc
/2GV3-6E6W] (last visited Feb. 12, 2017) (describing GRI's mission as helping "businesses,
governments and other organizations understand and communicate the impact of business on
critical sustainability issues such as climate change, human rights, corruption and many
others").
96.
Free Trade Agreement, supra note 89, art. 20.6(1).
97.
BUCK, supra note 76, at 32.
98.
Id.
99.
Ostrom, supra note 77, at 121.
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Protocol, UNFCCC itself, or the Kyoto Protocol, highlighting the
relative strength of this regime.10 0
Finally, Professor Ostrom's polycentric model recognizes that
robust systems generally have "governance activities .

.

. organized in

This nested-enterprise
multiple layers of nested enterprises. "101
principle asserts that "governance activities should be organized in
102
The growing
multiple layers of related governance regimes."
working in
accords
(minilateral)
reliance on bilateral and regional
in
phenomenon
concert with the WTO provide sound examples of this
103 And, as this paper posits, a multilevel system is
the free trade area.
also imperative in large ecological systems, like climate change efforts,
where distinct local dynamics simultaneously exist.104
2. The Importance of G2 Cooperation in a Polycentric Approach
The top-down approaches of the WTO and the UNFCCC are in
need of complementary governance regimes. While the WTO has been
effective in resolving trade disputes, its record in the area of
10 5
And the
sustainable development has long been criticized.
voluntary
on
dependent
is
laudable,
are
goals
UNFCCC, while its
compliance with no penalty (other than public shaming) for
Minilateral, tariff-reduction initiatives like the
violators.10 6
107
Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA), discussed below, are a step
They would be even more effective if
in the right direction.
supplemented by modifications to international trade rules that would
permit exporting nations to subsidize environmentally safe products
1 08
without fear of countervailing duties.
For more on this topic of regime effectiveness in the climate change context, see
100.
Shackelford, supra note 39, at 704.
Ostrom, supra note 77, at 118 tbl.5.3.
101.
Id. at 122.
102.
For example, see Free Trade Agreement, supra note 89.
103.
Ostrom, supra note 77, at 122.
104.
"[P]otentially environmentally friendly provisions of the General Agreements on
105.
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have been construed narrowly and thus provide little room for
sustainable development principles to pay meaningful roles in trade disputes." Enrique Rene de
Vera, The WTO and Biofuels: The Possibility of UnilateralSustainabilityRequirements, 8 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 661, 662 (2008). Yet, "for the ... [WTO] to survive, environmental resources must be
protected." Chelsea L. Braun, Responsibility for the Rose: Environmental Policy and the WTO, 82
UMKC L. REV. 537, 555 (2014).
See ParisAgreement, supra note 55.
106.
See infra text accompanying notes 314-318.
107.
In addition, "The WTO could ... allow members to ban the importation of goods that
108.
they determine not to be produced in accordance with WTO-sanctioned environmental
regulations. Or, the WTO could authorize members to place countervailing duties on goods that
they determine to result from production processes not in conformance with WTO-sanctioned
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Basically, to trigger the private sector buy-in that is essential
for success, trade barriers on environmental goods must be lessened.
This will "reduce the costs of green technologies, thereby supporting
efforts to address global challenges such as climate change."10 9 This
might be brought about through bilateral and multilateral agreements
that create "a list of non-actionable subsidies, including subsidies for
research and development assistance to adapt to new environmental
requirements." 110 A bilateral trade agreement between the United
States and China, with a strong environmental protection plank,
strikes us as a reasonable step in the right direction.
Because of their economic clout, coupled with their high carbon
emissions, China and the United States must lead this effort.
Importantly, now more than ever China appears ready to partner with
the United States in brokering environmental accords.
In recent
months, Chinese citizens have been in "open rebellion . . . [with]
pollution . . . accounting for half of all public protests."1 1 1 It has
become clear to Beijing's leadership "that environmental degradation
. . . [has] grown severe enough to challenge the party's own governing
mandate." 112 In short, the time is right for US engagement with
environmental standards." Braun, supra note 105, at 556-57. This would directly address the
need to induce private action implicated by the "carbon-price" model. See infra note 307 and
accompanying text.
109.
Joshua Meltzer, The Trans-Pacific PartnershipAgreement, the Environment and
Change, in TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE
TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENT
1
(Tania
Voon
ed.,
2014),
https://www.brookings.edulwp-content/uploads/2016/06/Meltzer-TPP-EnvironmentChapterversion-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/56FN-2EV8].
110.
Id. at 30. (explaining that Article 8 of the WTO's Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (SCM), which has since expired, originally contained a list of non-actionable subsidies;
nevertheless, another complementary approach would be for developed nations like the United
States to use their Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs to grant additional tariff
reductions to exports from lesser-developed nations that adopt sustainable production methods);
see RICH A RDS & SHACKELFORD, supra note 82, at 148; de Vera, supra note 105, at 676 ("Under
the GSP program, countries are permitted to extend preferential tariff reductions to exports from
lesser-developed nations that adopt sustainable production methods."); cf. Appellate Body
Report, European Communities-Conditionsfor the Grantingof Tariff Preferences to Developing
Countries, T 95, WTO Doc. WT/DS246/AB/R (adopted Apr. 7, 2004) (holding that sustainable
development is a permissible goal for increased tariff preferences under the GSP). The European
Union already has pledged to use its GSP Plus program to provide "tariff reductions beyond the
standard GSP reductions for countries that ratify and implement core international conventions
relating to . . . [the] environment." Michael Scaturo, EU to Promote Sustainability, Tackle
Corruption via Free Trade Agreements, 32 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at
2133 (Dec. 10,
2015).
111.
Andrew Browne, For China "Mandateof Heaven" at Stake in Paris Talks, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 9, 2015, at All. ("China's intentions are clear. It is committed to increasing the share of
nonfossil fuels [in] its primary energy mix to 20%, also by 2030, equivalent to the entire
electrical-generation capacity of the US.")
112.
Id.
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China on sustainability issues. In addition to the two countries'
113 there are
shared responsibility and concern with climate change,
sound economic reasons why they should pursue a bilateral
investment treaty (BIT). 114 Importantly, the US Congress, through its
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), has
"called for the expansion of trade promotion authority (TPA) to cover
the prospective US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty." 1 5 However,
and as the next Part discusses, past and current US practices
regarding its international trade obligations in general, and China in
particular, threaten the prospects for such cooperation.
III. INCONSISTENCIES IN US TRADE POLICY
Joint leadership by the United States and China is crucial to
the long-term success of the Paris Agreement. However, their ability
to cooperatively lead the way is dependent upon their ability to
generate a high level of mutual trust. This Part discusses how US
failure to abide by past international commitments may undermine
such trust, especially given the inevitable changes in policy priorities
between presidential administrations. 1 16
A. US Rhetoric Versus Reality
The United States has a checkered history of living up to its
free trade rhetoric when global competition threatens entrenched
As a part of its stated desire to move forward on a BIT with the United States, China
113.
has expressed an interest in "expand[ing] mutually beneficial cooperation in ... environmental
protection." Cheryl Bolen, US, China Agree to "Step Up" Work on Bilateral Investment Treaty, 32
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1704 (Oct. 1, 2015).
Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Wants a Bilateral Investment Treaty with the United
114.
States, 33 B.U. INT'L L.J. 421, 439 (2015).
[Foreign direct investment] from China is subject to US law, which allows the United
States to block or unravel investment transactions that involve China with political
pressure and opposition. A BIT between the United States and China could limit the
ability of the United States to block or unravel such transactions.
Id. Simultaneously, a "well-designed BIT could create new investment opportunities for U.S.
companies in China by allowing U.S. companies to invest in sectors that are now restricted." Id.
at 423-24.
Len Bracken, China Commission Seeks TPA Expansion to Cover US-China
115.
Investment Treaty, 32 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 2019 (Nov. 19, 2015). 'The commission,
which was created by Congress in 2000, is charged with monitoring and investigating the
national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship." Id.
See Greg Sargent, The GOP CandidatesAre Ignoring the Paris Climate Deal. That's
116.
WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plumThing,
a Good
line/wp/2015/12/16/the-gop-candidates-are-ignoring-the-paris-climate-deal-thats-a-good-thing/
[https://perma.cc/59EJ-6EGC].
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domestic interests. There are numerous examples of instances in
which the United States has openly flouted its international trade law
obligations when they come under fire from special interests groups at
home.1 17 We argue that US failure to abide by the very rules it
demands that others follow does more than set a bad example; it
undermines the country's position as a moral leader on pressing global
issues, including sustainable development.1 1 8
And, of equal
importance, it encourages China to follow a similar path.
This shortcoming has been manifest in a variety of ways, both
inside and outside the sustainable development context. For instance,
the recent completion of negotiations for the TPP illustrates the
United States' reluctance to fully commit to certain international
norms. That treaty-yet to be ratified as of this writing-contains, in
Article 29.2, a provision the United States regularly insists upon in its
investment treaties. This is a security exception that stresses that a
nation is not prevented from "applying measures that it considers
necessary

for the

.

.

. protection

of its

own

essential

security

interests."11 9 While on one level a national security exception makes
sense, 120 the US approach goes much further, with the country

117.
This is nothing new. "The developing world has long accused the United States ... of
preaching free trade and forcing open markets in the developing countries while concurrently
protecting . . . [its] domestic producers from foreign competition." Eric L. Richards, Scott J.
Shackelford & Abbey Stemler, US Resistance to Global Trade Rules and the Implications for
Cybersecurity and Internet Governance, 24 MINN. J. INT'L L. 159, 159 (2015) (citing JOSEPH E.
STIGLITz, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 244 (2002)). "This scene unfolds with increasing
regularity in the United States. Political decision makers, while espousing free trade rhetoric,
often replace globalization and the theory of comparative advantage with strategic intervention,
whereby free trade policies are supplemented by varying combinations of export assistance and
import barriers." Id. at 160 (citing Alan 0. Sykes, The PersistentPuzzles of Safeguards:Lessons
from the Steel Dispute, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 523, 564 (2004)).
118.
It has been argued that the United States, while urging other nations to open their
markets to free trade, simultaneously flouts WTO rules by subsidizing its domestic industry. In
this way, "the authority of the US as a model for legal protection [of] international trade ... is
undermined." Joseph M. Barbato, Byrd Watching: Continuation of the Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act, 14 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 45, 50 (2005); cf. Gary G. Yerkey,
ProtectionistPressures in US Forcing Bush to Ignore WTO Obligations, EC Says, 21 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 33 (Jan. 1, 2004) (explaining that the EU Commission concludes that
domestic protectionist pressures are "stronger than ...
[Washington's] willingness to seek
internationally agreed solutions").
119.
Trans-Pacific Partnership art. 29.2(b), Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/F573AGCB].
120.
Article XXI of the GATT permits a WTO member to take actions it "considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests ... or ... for the maintenance of
international peace and security." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXI (1), Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, http://www.marxists.org/history/capitalism/gatt/ch21.htm
[https://perma.cc/4J7G-M8EH].
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generally insisting "that this right is self-judging. That is, the country
claims that it may subjectively determine what constitutes national
security." 121 Although the United States now concedes that this
national security exemption incorporates an obligation that each party
"act in good faith," 122 recent cases involving Chinese investments in
123
If the
the United States cast some doubt on these assurances.
United States is suspected of making empty promises in the
investment context, how can China (or other trade partners) trust US
commitments made in other important arenas like climate change?
Chinese investors in the United States have long complained of
the refusal by the US government to provide clear guidelines
explaining what types of investments are likely to trigger the national
security exception. 124 The US Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States (CFIUS)-the governmental agency charged with
ensuring that foreign investments do not threaten national securitywas accused of bowing to political pressure and arbitrarily blocking
Chinese investments. 125 This dispute escalated when a US federal
district court dismissed a lawsuit filed by Chinese investors who
complained that the US government refused to provide any specific
reasons why their purchase of a wind farm was a threat to national
security. 126 Ultimately, however, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia faulted CFIUS and President Obama for failing
to provide the investors with notice of evidence upon which they relied
in making this finding. Specifically, the appellate court concluded
that due process required that the investors be "given access to the
[government] relied and be
unclassified evidence on which the ...
127
afforded an opportunity to rebut that evidence."
Indeed, it seems that when China enters the equation, the US
128
Consider the TPP.
government takes a more combative posture.

121.

KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, US INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 196--99

(2009).
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 212.
See infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
Lucy Hornby, China Commerce Minister Seeks Clearer US Investment Guide,

REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/08/us-china-parliament-trade-

idUSBRE92705K20130308 [https://perma.cc/L6W9-PHYS].
See generally Scott J. Shackelford, Eric Richards, Anjanette Raymond & Amanda
125.
Craig, Using BITs to Protect Bytes: Promoting Cyber Peace and Safeguarding Trade Secrets
Through BilateralInvestment Treaties, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2015).
See generally Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 987 F. Supp. 2d 18
126.
(D.D.C. 2013).
Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 319 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
127.
This anti-China focus has revealed itself in the area of cybersecurity where the
128.
Justice Department has engaged in aggressive espionage investigations and prosecutions aimed
at ferreting out Chinese spies in the United States. Yet, in 2015, in two high profile cases
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On November 5, 2015, the executive branch released the text of the
agreement to the public and the President officially notified Congress
of his intent to sign the deal. 129 In preparation for the uphill battle to
gain congressional approval in an election year, the President, rather
than extol the virtues of the free trade regime, announced: "If we don't
pass this agreement-if America doesn't write those rules-then
countries like China will." 130 This was not the first time that
President Obama used anti-China rhetoric to pitch the TPP. 131
In contrast to this anti-China tone from the US leadership,
China has displayed a more tactful posture.
Zhang Xiangchen,
China's deputy international trade representative, told reporters that
"no US officials have welcomed Chinese participation in the TPP, but
Beijing welcomes the TPP initiative and hopes that it will be open and
inclusive, eventually bolstering the multilateral trading system." 32
This statement, if true, reinforces the view that Beijing would like to

involving Chinese academics working in the United States, the Justice Department was forced to
withdraw charges after it became clear that no illegal conduct had occurred. Matt Apuzzo, US
Drops Charges That Professor Shared Technology with China, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/us/politics/us-drops-charges-that-professor-sharedtechnology-with-china.html?emc=edit th_20150912&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=52536178&_r=O
[https://perma.cc/M6JX-U6LQ; Nicole Periroth, Accused of Spying for China, Until She Wasn't,
N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/10/business/accused-of-spying-forchina-until-she-wasnt.html [https://perma.cc/HT4L-9SY3] ("[Miore than half of the economic
.espionage indictments since 2013 have had a China connection. . . . 'They came across a person of
Chinese descent and a little bit of evidence that they may have been trying to benefit the
Chinese government, but it's clear there was a little bit of Red Scare and racism involved,' said
Peter J. Toren, a former federal prosecutor who specialized in computer crimes and industrial
espionage.").

129.
See Vicki Needham, Obama Tells Congress He Will Sign TPP, HILL (Nov. 5, 2015,
4:53 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/fmnance/259322-obama-tells-congress-he-will-sign-the-tpp-pact
[https://perma.cc/45QL-YGNE].
130.
See Here's the Deal: The Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, MEDIUM,
https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership/here-s-the-deal-the-text-of-the-trans-pacificpartnership-103adc324500#.57hjirkqs [https://perma.ccfUK7M-LZ5T] (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
131.
Jackie Calmes, Trans-Pacific PartnershipDeal Is Reached, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/201 5/10/06/business/trans-pacific-partnership-trade-deal-isreached.html?emc=edit-na 20151005&nlid=52536178&ref=cta&_r=0
[https://perma.cclTZ65YR8G] ("When more than 95 percent of our potential customers live outside our borders, we
can't let countries like China write the rules of the global economy,' Mr. Obama said in a
statement."). Of course, this is not the first time foreign policy issues have been used to defend
trade deals. "Such arguments can be easier to grasp than the mind numbing details of trade
agreements. President Bill Clinton argued that the North American Free Trade Agreement
would bolster Mexico and frustrate Japan's ambitions in the Western Hemisphere." Bob Davis,
The US-China Disconnect on Trade Deals, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2015, at 8.
132.
Len Bracken, Beijing Looks for Speedy TPP Conclusion So Washington Can Focus on
BIT Negotiation, 32 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1160 (June 25, 2015).
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see a speedy conclusion to the TPP so the US can focus on a US-China
BIT. 133
Despite its suspicion of China, the Obama Administration did
seem to understand the importance of closer cooperation with
China. 134 After all, accompanying China's recent economic swoon are
potential benefits to the United States as "big Chinese firms .

.

. [are]

likely to invest more in the [United States] as returns on investment
13 5 In fact, in the
shrink in China and expand in the [United States]."
year prior to China's economic downturn, "Chinese companies plowed
$12 billion into the [United States], up from zero in the early 2000s,
making it the fastest growing source of foreign direct investment in
the country." 136 Thus, a major impetus for President Xi Jingping's
visit to Washington in 2015 was to garner support for a BIT aimed at
encouraging Chinese ventures in the United States and opening up
access to foreign investment in China where it is barred or
restricted.137
The test will be how well the US government is able to balance
its desire for greater China-US cooperation on environmental and
trade policy with wariness over Chinese military and economic power.
Tensions are mounting as the United States interjects itself in the
middle of China's conflicts with its neighbors over territorial claims to
islands in the South and East China Seas. Though recent US naval
patrols in the contested waters were intended to be a cautious
approach, they run the risk of provoking President Xi, especially since
they occurred in the midst of his meeting with the Communist Party's
Central Committee. 138
China's claim to the artificial islands has been described as
"intent to break free from what it sees as American
country's
that
encirclemepnt-a system of alliances that reaches from the Korean
peninsula through Japan and the Philippines.... [T]hey are symbols

133.
Id.
Cheryl Bolen, US, China to "Step Up" Work on BilateralInvestment Treaty, 32 Int'l
134.
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1703 (Oct. 1, 2015). 'The two countries will expand mutually
beneficial cooperation in energy, environmental protection, science and technology, aviation,
infrastructure, agriculture, health and other areas. . . ." Id. at 1704.
Bob Davis, China Woes Could Be Good for US Economy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2015,
135.
at A2.
Bonnie Cao & Ye Xie, Chinese Companies Build Factories in US, but Investors Bring
136.
Tensions Along with Jobs, 32 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1559 (Sept. 10, 2015).
Id. For more on the proposed US-China BIT and its implications (including in the
137.
cybersecurity context), see Shackelford et al., supra note 125, at 1-4.
Jeremy Page, Gordon Lubold & Adam Entous, Navy Tests China over Sea Claims,
138.
WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2015, at Al, A12. This meeting was viewed "as a test of Mr. Xi's political
standing." Id.
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of a thrusting nationalism under President Xi Jingping." 139 Of course,
for the United States, the stakes are equally high. 140 The hope is that
the two powers will avoid escalation because they understand the
need for cooperation.
"But nationalism is the wild card.
It's
inconceivable that Mr. Xi, a popular strongman, won't respond in some
way, and he'll be under greater pressure to act if public opinion
becomes inflamed." 14 1
The pressure on China's leadership should not be
underestimated. Chinese leaders are confronted by a need to manage
internal crises, particularly the country's pollution and slowing
economic growth, while simultaneously facing the external threat
posed by US attempts to contain Chinese influence in East and South
Asia. Their response to these threats has been described as:
a dual strategy of "strike the mountain to shock the tiger" and "kill the chicken to
scare the monkey." The first strategy is an internal approach designed to take
down a few powerful leaders to scare the lesser ones. The second strategy is an
external approach in which leaders go after lesser powers to diminish the role or
prevent the involvement of a greater power. 14 2

China's assertion of dominance over the contested waters
concerns the United States (the greater power) and Japan, the
Philippines, and Vietnam (the lesser powers). 143
Thus, direct
involvement by the United States in the territorial dispute, coupled
with the China containment language behind US motivations for the
TPP, only fuel nationalist flames within China. In particular, China's
leaders might well view the TPP as an "every country but China"
treaty.144 Ultimately, the United States must tread lightly because,
despite China's fears of encirclement, Beijing still recognizes the
importance of a cooperative relationship with the United States on
issues like investment and the environment.
The United States must be careful not to sabotage this
opportunity. Recent history illustrates that China will fight back if
provoked. For instance, in the international trade arena, it took the

139.
Andrew Browne, Horizon Shifts in Spratly Islands Dispute, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28,
2015, at A12.
140.
"For America, the stakes are equally high: Its future as a maritime power in the
Asia-Pacific; the credibility of its security guarantees to its allies-all of them concerned about
China's growing military might, and the principle that territorial disputes must be resolved on
the basis of law, not coercion." Id.
141.
Id.
142.
J.M. Norton, Why China Wants to "Strike the Mountain" and 'Kill the Chicken,"
DIPLOMAT (Jan. 9, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/0 1/why-china-wants-to-strike-themountain-and-kill-the-chicken/ [https://perma.cc/2773-TSB6].
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
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United States almost a decade to finally come into compliance with a
string of WTO rulings condemning its practice of zeroing in on
"dumping" investigations. 145 Simultaneously, the country also refused
to comply with WTO panel decisions that held its practice of
distributing the proceeds of antidumping tariffs to domestic producers
to be WTO-illegal. 146 Even when compliance did occur, it seemed to be
more a result of "a realization that reform was the only way to avoid
147
retaliatory tariffs imposed on US exports by major trade partners."
US use and abuse of antidumping laws has created several
First, "the very concept of antidumping relief
adverse results.
148 Those
fire from much of the developing world."
under
was
[already]
nations complained that the antidumping regime is part of a "baitand-switch" scam foisted on the developing world by the major forces
149
behind their creation-the United States and the European Union.
Basically, the critics claim that after convincing the WTO members to
lower their tariffs in the name of free trade, the United States and
European Union turned to the antidumping remedy to raise tariffs on
imports from those same nations. 150 However, in the case of China,
this device is returning to haunt both the United States and the
European Union. This is because, "rather than challenging the legal
standard originally put in place by the United States and EU, . .

145.

"Dumping refers to the selling of products in an export market for less than fair

value (less than the price in the home market or lest than cost)." ERIC L. RICHARDS & SCoTT J.
SHACKELFORD, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 161 (2014).
[Z]eroing may occur when an importing country averages a number of importations in

determining if products are being sold below fair market value.... [R]ather than give
full credit for the negative margins (the amount by which export prices exceeded
normal value), the importing country would count any negative subgroup dumping
margins as zero.

Id. at 162. This impermissibly inflates the dumping margin. Id.
Known as the "Byrd Amendment," this statute was designed "to support companies
146.
threatened by overseas competition. However. . . when the anti-dumping duties bring imports up
to market value, . . . the subsequent payments subsidize the American producers that are no

longer at an unfair disadvantage." Andrew Platt, Note and Comment, The Fate of Domestic
Exporters Under the Byrd Amendment: A

Case For Resuscitating the Last-in-Time Treaty

Interpretation, 3 BYU INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 171, 171 (2007).
Richards, Shackelford & Stemler, supra note 117, at 165 (citation omitted). "Once
147.
the WTO gave approval of the assessment of more than $150 million annual trade sanctions on
US exports, the Byrd Amendment was repealed." Id. at 167-68 (citations omitted).
Id. at 166.
148.
Mark Wu, Antidumping in Asia's Emerging Giants, 53 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 3 n.3
149.
(2012) (citing DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, PETROS C. MAVROIDIS & ALAN 0. SYKES, THE GENESIS OF THE

GATT 144-46 (2008); 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY 1389-1691
(Terrence P. Steward ed., 1993)).
Id. at 3.
150.
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Antidumping duties now account for

more than 90 percent of the domestic protection measures employed
throughout the world, and China, along with India, leads the world in
using the device. 152 Importantly, recent attempts by the United States
to correct this imbalance to free trade face a major obstacle: "Most
countries . . . [now] view the United States as the major impediment to

serious antidumping reform." 153

B. Double Standards in the Name of Sustainability
The United States also has a long history of noncompliance
with global rules in the area of sustainable development. Generally,
this takes the form of a failure to consult with trade partners and an
insistence that all parties comply with the "US solution" to global
problems. For example, more than two decades ago, the United States
enacted legislation-the Marine Mammal Protection Act 154 (MMPA)
and the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act15 5 (DPCIA)-to
limit the incidental killing of marine mammals (dolphins specifically)
by tuna fleets. The MMPA imposed an embargo on imports of tuna
from countries that harvest yellowfin tuna in the Eastern Tropical
Pacific Ocean (ETP) with purse-seine nets. 15 6 The DPCIA forbids
foreign and domestic use of "dolphin-safe" labels on tuna products
harvested in the ETP with purse-seine nets.1 57
In response to
complaints from Mexico (and, later, the European Community), two
GATT Dispute settlement panels-first in 1991 (Tuna 1)158 and second

151.
Id. at 18-19.
152.
Id. at 18.
153.
Id. at 58 n.218 (citing Michael 0. Moore, Antidumping Reform in the WTO: A
Pessimistic Appraisal, 12 PAC. EcoN. REV. 357, 373-74 (2007)).
154.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (2012).
155.
Id. § 1385.
156.
Id.
The MMPA was enacted by the US Congress to prevent serious injury or incidental
killing of marine mammals in the course of commercial fishing, especially in the
Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP). The ETP was of special concern to Congress
because dolphins and tuna inhabit the same areas in these waters. Knowing this,
commercial fishermen in the ETP intentionally encircled the dolphins with purseseine nets in order to catch the tuna swimming underneath.
Carol J. Beyers, Comment, The US/Mexico Tuna Embargo Dispute: A Case Study of the GATT
and Environmental Progress, 16 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 229, 233 (1992) (citations omitted),
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1421&context=mjil
[https://perma.cc/DMT6-FY9H].
157.
Id. at 235.
158.
Dispute Settlement Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) (not adopted) [hereinafter Tuna I].
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in 1994 (Tuna II) 159 -Concluded that the embargo violated GATT
rules. 160 The Tuna I panel found the MMPA to be an impermissible
quantitative restriction on tuna imports because the United States
was unable to demonstrate that the measure was "necessary" for the
protection of dolphins. 161 More specifically, the panel chided the
United States for failing to "pursue its dolphin protection objectives
through measures consistent with [GATT], in particular through
negotiation of international cooperative arrangements."1 6 2 In Tuna II,
the GATT panel reiterated that the US goal of protecting an
exhaustible natural resource was in and of itself not sufficient to
justify the imposition of the tuna embargo. To hold otherwise, in the
panel's view, would seriously impair the rights and obligations of all
sovereign nations because it would permit the United States to "force
other contracting parties [to the GATT] to change their policies within
1 63
their jurisdiction, including their conservation policies."
Tuna I and Tuna II were both decided by panels in the preWTO era. However, despite the passage of more than twenty years
and the creation of the WTO, the US dolphin conservation regime still
violates international trade rules. Recently, the WTO appellate body
confirmed that the dolphin-safe labeling requirements mandated by
the DPCIA discriminate against Mexican tuna imports from the
ETP.1 64 Despite a US promise to amend its labeling rules to come into
compliance with the WTO appellate body decision, 165 on December 3,

&

&

Dispute Settlement Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
159.
33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) (not adopted) [hereinafter Tuna II].
For a discussion of the Tuna I and Tuna II panel reports, see Eric L. Richards
160.
The Sea Turtle Dispute: Implications for Sovereignty, the Environment, and
McCrory,
Martin A.
InternationalTrade Law, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 295, 325-29 (2000).
Tuna I, supra note 158, at 1619-20.
161.
See id. at 1620. The panel stressed that such an approach "would seem to be
162.
in
view of the fact that dolphins roam the waters of many states and the high seas." Id.
desirable
See Tuna II, supra note 159, at 894.
163.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Concerning the Importation,
164.
Marketing and Sale of Tuna Products, ¶ 298, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (adopted May 16,
2012). More specifically, the panel concluded that the special rules for the ETP did not "stem
from legitimate regulatory distinctions." Id. ¶ 297. See generally Charlotte Blattner, Global
Animal Law: Hope Beyond Illusion: The Potential and Potential Limits of International Law in
Regulating Animal Matters, 3 MID-ATLANTIC J.L. & PUB. POLY 10 (2015); Jonathan Carlone,
An Added Exception to the TBT Agreement After Clove, Tuna II, and Cool, 37 B.C. INT'L
COMP. L. REV. 103 (2014); Meredith Kolsky Lewis & Andrew D. Mitchell, Food Miles:
Environmental Protection or Veiled Protectionism, 35 MICH. J. INT'L L. 579 (2014); Lauren
Sullivan, The EPIC Struggle for Dolphin-Safe Tuna: To Be Continued-A Case for
Accommodating Nonprotectionist Eco-Labels in the WTO, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 861 (2014).
Bryce Baschuk, US 'Dolphin-Safe" Labels Still Illegal, Says World Trade
165.
OrganizationPanel, 32 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 2049 (Nov. 26, 2015).
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2015, the WTO adopted an appellate body finding that the US rules
still discriminated against Mexican tuna products. 166
The tuna disputes are not isolated incidents. In one of the
earliest tests of the WTO's then newly created dispute settlement
process, Venezuela challenged US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) regulations designed to cap polluting compounds in gasoline at
1990 levels. 167 These regulations, promulgated pursuant to Title II of
the Clean Air Act,1 68 provided domestic refineries with three separate
methods for determining their 1990 baselines. 169 Foreign refineries,
on the other hand, were restricted to only one of the methods.17 0 As a
result, the WTO appellate body sided with Venezuela, 171 concluding
that the differential treatment constituted arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination.1 7 2 While acknowledging that the United States faced
administrative problems in verifying foreign baselines, 173 the panel
did not believe those practical difficulties justified the discriminatory
treatment. 174 Ultimately, the United States was faulted for failing to
explore cooperative arrangements with Venezuela to address the
administrative obstacles,175 as well as for considering the costs on
domestic refineries and disregarding those of their foreign
counterparts when devising the baseline regulations.1 76
Undaunted, the United States played a similar refrain several
years later when it imposed an embargo on certain shrimp imports in
an effort to prevent sea turtles from drowning in the nets of shrimp
trawlers.
US legislation-the Endangered Species Act of 1973

&

166.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶ 407, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (adopted
Dec. 3, 2015).
167.
"[M]obile sources (primarily automobiles) ... [were] the largest single source of air
pollution in the United States." Martin A. McCrory & Eric L. Richards, Clearing the Air: The
Clean Air Act, GATT and the WTO Reformulated Gasoline Decision, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L.
POL'Y 1, 6-7 (1999).
168.
Clean Air Act of 1990, § 211, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) (2012).
169.
See McCrory & Richards, supra note 167, at 11-13.
170.
The EPA claimed that administrative difficulties in verifying the accuracy of data
from foreign refineries, in part, justified the distinction. Id. at 13-15.
171.
Appellate Body Report,
United States-Standards for Reformulated and
ConventionalGasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R, 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996) (adopted Sept. 25, 1997).
172.
Id. at 627.
173.
Id. at 629-30.
174.
Id. at 631.
175.
Id. The fact that Congress had actually blocked such efforts by denying funding for
the negotiations did not impress the panel. It stressed that the United States "carries
responsibility for actions of both the executive and legislative departments of government." Id. at
631-32.
176.
Id. at 632.
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17 7 Regulations
(ESA)-listed sea turtles as an endangered species.
designed to implement the ESA required American shrimp trawlers to
1 8 Responding to
employ turtle excluder devices (TEDs) on their nets.
complaints from US shrimpers that the regulations placed them at a
competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis foreign shrimp imports and from
179 Congress
environmentalists that the protection was not sufficient,
broadened their reach by: (1) requiring the US Secretary of State to
negotiate international agreements to protect sea turtles and (2)
blocking the import of shrimp that was harvested in a manner that
threatened sea turtles unless the President certified that the
harvesting nation had a regulatory program comparable to that of the
United States.1 80 When environmentalists argued that the United
States was not strictly enforcing the embargo, the US Court of
International Trade, rejecting arguments that such an action would
have international law ramifications, ordered the government to
comply with the law. 181 Continued delays by the executive branch of
government resulted in even more domestic litigation, with the court
repeatedly stressing the priority that US domestic law has over the
country's international law obligations. 182
In United Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
183 In
Products, the WTO appellate body condemned the US approach.
a scathing attack, the panel criticized the US statute's "intended and
actual coercive effect on the specific policy decisions made by foreign
governments." 18 4 While the legislation did attempt to correct the flaws
of its earlier initiatives in the Tuna and Reformulated Gasoline cases
by requiring the executive branch to negotiate with other shrimpharvesting nations, the US government failed to follow through on

50 C.F.R. § 223.205(a) (2017).
177.
Id. § 223.206(d)(2)(i).
178.
See Richards & McCrory, supra note 160, at 298 ("Environmentalists ... protested
179.
that restrictions that were confined to the shrimping operations in United States waters would
be largely ineffective since sea turtles migrate across national boundaries.").
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
180.
Appropriations Act of 1990 § 609, 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (2012).
Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559, 579-80 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995).
181.
See generally Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 922 F. Supp. 616 (Ct. Int'l Trade
182.
1996); Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 942 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996); Earth Island
Inst. v. Christopher, 948 F. Supp. 1062 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996). The US Court of International
[court] is not the proper forum for foreign accommodation or
Trade stated that "this ...
circumvention." 948 F. Supp. at 1066.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
183.
Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), 38 I.L.M. 118 (1999).
Id. ¶ 161. The WTO appellate body panel described the US statute as a "rigid and
184.
unbending standard" that the United States sought to impose on other sovereign governments.
Id.
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this mandate.18 5 The United States negotiated with and provided
countries in the western hemisphere (mainly in the Caribbean), but
not other countries, technical and financial assistance and longer
transition periods for their fishermen to start using TEDs. 186 This
failure to pursue comprehensive negotiations with all of the shrimp
exporting nations violated international trade rules prohibiting
discriminatory treatment.
The importance of this omission is
underscored by the fact that, soon after the appellate body report was
issued, the US Department of Commerce revised its shrimp
harvesting rules to permit shrimp imports as long as a country could
show that it required a "comparably effective" regulatory program. Of
equal importance, the United States expanded its efforts to negotiate
an agreement with shrimp harvesting nations around the world and
offered and began providing technical assistance on the design,
construction, installation, and operation of TEDs. 187
Despite these efforts, Malaysia again brought an action before
the WTO, asserting that the steps taken by the United States were
still GATT-illegal because it had not actually concluded a treaty with
the United States. This time, however, the appellate body sided with
the United States, reasoning that the serious, good faith efforts to
negotiate an international agreement by the United States were
sufficient to overcome the earlier flaws of the sea turtle protection
program.18 8
The lesson seems clear: the WTO will permit US
environmental measures-even those that impose restrictions on
international trade-as long as they are nondiscriminatory and
shaped by comprehensive negotiations with our international trade
partners.
C. Losing Its COOL: Lessons Not Learned
On December 7, 2015, the WTO appellate body authorized
Canada and Mexico to impose over one billion dollars in retaliatory
tariffs on US goods because of meat labeling rules that discriminate

185.
Although section 609(a)(1)-(5) of the statute instructs the State Department to
negotiate agreements with foreign nations, section 609(b) simultaneously orders the executive
branch to ban the importation of shrimp from nations that fail to meet the existing US
standards. 16 U.S.C. § 1537. The Appellate Body condemned the "coercive effect" of this
approach. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 183, ¶ 161.
186.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 183, T 175.
187.
See Richards & McCrory, supra note 160, at 324-25.
188.
Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products-Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, T 5.137, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/RW
(June 15, 2001).
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189
The country-of-origin
against Canadian and Mexican imports.
labeling law (COOL) was originally enacted to help food buyers avoid
19 0
meat products from countries with substandard food safety rules.
However, five previous WTO panels, the latest in May 2015, concluded
that the regulatory regime imposed unnecessary costs on the imported
meat products.19 1 Curiously, while the United States amended the
COOL rules after the panel first found it to be discriminatory, "a WTO
panel [then] found that the amended COOL measures . . . were more
192
harmful to foreign competition than the original rules."
The stakes for the United States in this case are huge,
particularly for a measure of questionable value to US consumers.193
After all, "[e]xcluding the European Union, Canada is the [United
States'] largest trading partner with $658 billion in total two-way
goods trade in 2014. Mexico is the [United States'] third-biggest
trading partner with $534 billion in total two-way good trade in
2014."194 That cost should be weighed against the WTO appellate
body panel's finding that "the burden on producers was too great given
9
the small amount of information to be gleaned by consumers." s
Unfortunately, there is no certainty that the United States will
compliance. As with the previous disputes, the executive
into
come

Appellate Body Report, United States-CertainCountry of Origin Labelling (COOL)
189.
Requirements, WTO Doc. WT/DS384/AB/RW, WT/DS386/AB/RW (Dec. 7, 2015); cf. Bryce
Baschuk, Canada, Mexico Allowed to Impose Sanctions of $1B Until US Fixes Meat Labeling
Rules, 32 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 49, at 2116 (Dec. 10, 2015).
Kelsey Gee & Paul Vieira, WTO Hits U.S. over Labeling of Meat, WALL ST. J., Dec.
190.
B3.
8, 2015, at
Panel Report, United States-Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL)
191.
Requirements, WTO Doc. WT/DS384/R, WTIDS386/R (Nov. 18, 2011); Appellate Body Report,
United States-Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, T 350, WTO Doc.
WT/DS384/ABIR, WT/DS386/AB/R (June 29, 2012); Arbitration Report, United States-Certain
Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, T 73, WTO Doc. WT/DS384/24, WT/DS386/23
(Dec. 4, 2012); Panel Report, United States-Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL)
Requirements, ¶ 8.3, WTO Doc. WT/DS384/RW, WT/DS386/RW (Oct. 20, 2014); Appellate Body
Report, United States-Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, ¶ 6.2, WTO
Doc. WT/DS384/AB/RW, WT/DS386/AB/RW (May 18, 2015).
Bryce Baschuk & Catherine Boudreau, WTO Rejects US Appeal of COOL
192.
Requirements Covering Meat-Labeling, 32 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 21, at 924 (May 21, 2015).
"'We have long said that COOL is not just burdensome and costly to cattle producers,
193.
it is generally ignored by consumers and violates our international trade obligations,' said Philip
Ellis, president of the National Cattlemen's Beef Association." Id.
Id.
194.
See Carlone, supra note 164, at 129 (citing Appellate Body Report, United States195.
Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, ¶¶ 347-50, WTO Doc.
that the country-ofWT/DS384/AB/R, WT/DS386/AB/R (June 29, 2012)). "The WTO said ...
origin labels 'impose a disproportionate burden on producers and processors of livestock that
cannot be explained by the need to provide origin information to consumers."' Tennille Tracy,
WTO Rules Against US Meat Labels, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2015, at A5.
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branch of the government-in this case, the US Department of
Agriculture (USDA)-is left with little room to maneuver. According
to former Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack:
[t]hose working on this inside the USDA have said there isn't much capacity to
come into compliance with the WTO rules . . . . The WTO said we can't enforce the
additional burden of segregation of livestock, but Congress said meat has to be
labeled telling consumers it's a USA product, which requires segregation. We're
stuck. We need congressional action. 196

D. Rhetoric Must Match Reality
The dilemma faced by the US Agriculture Secretary plays out
repeatedly. That is, on a consistent basis, the United States has failed
to comply with the very global trade rules that it was instrumental in
creating. To demand that others comply with a rules-based system
while simultaneously flaunting those very rules at the behest of
special interests threatens the country.19 7
In some instances, the executive branch has been stymied in its
attempts to honor international commitments made by the US
Congress. 198 Even in the Sea Turtle case, where Congress actually
instructed the State Department to negotiate with US trade partners,
the legislature was not sincerely attempting to achieve a true
multilateral solution. 199 After all, that same statute "simultaneously
directed the executive branch to ban shrimp imports from nations that
did not meet US regulatory standards.

Thus, . . . Congress sought to

impose its own solution on the world trading community." 200

&

196.
Rossella Brevetti, Report Language Calls on Ag Secretary to Make COOL
Recommendations, 31 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 2155 (Dec. 18, 2014).
197.
'"America's commitment to freer trade looks laughable,' reinforcing accusations from
trading partners that Washington is backsliding on negotiated trade concessions because of its
inability to resist the protectionist demands of domestic producers." See Richards, Shackelford
Stemler, supra note 117, at 172 (quoting Kevin K. Ho, Trading Rights and Wrongs: The 2002
Bush Steel Tariffs, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 825 (2003)).
198.
This occurred in the Reformulated Gasoline case where Congress blocked funding for
US efforts to negotiate a reasonable solution with Venezuela. See McCrory & Richards, supra
note 167, at 41. Further, after the United States promised to comply with the WTO appellate
body decision in the Tuna Labeling dispute, see supra text accompanying note 151, Congress
refused to act. This was not surprising. It has been observed that "Congress ... has a history of
not responding well when told to change domestic policies. In fact, it was Congress' refusal to
amend its legislation that landed the US at the WTO in the first place." Marie Wilke, Tuna
Labeling and the WTO: How Safe Is "Dolphin-Safe?", BIORES (June 18, 2012),
http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/biores/news/tuna-labelling-and-the-wto-how-safe-is-dolphinsafe [https://perma.cc/8U29-UQ4R].
199.
See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
200.
Richards & McCrory, supra note 160, at 337 (citing Departments of Commerce,
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990 § 609, 16
U.S.C. § 1537 (2012)).
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Special interests and the resulting congressional struggle to
supplant the executive branch in the field of international relations
explain many of the problems the United States has faced in
complying with international rules. In the Tuna, Sea Turtle, and
COOL cases, unbending laws hindered the executive branch's efforts
to comply with the country's. obligations under GATT. It would seem
that the balance between the executive and legislative branches must
be reestablished to avoid a special interest-driven Congress from
sabotaging international trade relations. In fact, the US Supreme
Court long ago warned against this distortion of the doctrine of
20 1
separation of powers in the global arena.
The role of special interests in the US political system is not
the only explanation for the rigid and uncompromising nature of so
many US interactions with its global partners. The fact is that this
202
For
often overbearing approach is deeply rooted in US culture.
ranks
States]
[United
the
world,
the
of
nations
the
of
all
instance, "of
203
This is often manifested by
the highest in terms of individualism."
an egocentrism, outspokenness, and acceptance of conflict (so long as
it is believed that an adversarial path will lead to desired
objectives). 204 In addition, the country ranks high on the universalism
scale, 205 which translates into a willingness "to impose . . . [one's]
Finally, "[i]nner-directed cultures, like the
values on others." 206

"[L]egislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within
201.
the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from
statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved."
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 321 (1936); see Yong K. Kim, The
Beginnings of the Rule of Law in the International Trade System Despite United States
Constitutional Constraints, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 967, 994 n.147 (1996).
Eric L. Richards, Contracting from East to West: Bridging the Cultural Divide, 57
202.
BUS. HORIZONS 677, 679 (2014). Culture is a shared system of meanings. It dictates what we pay
attention to, how we act, and what we value. FONS TROMPENAARS & CHARLES HAMPDENTURNER, RIDING THE WAVES OF CULTURE: UNDERSTANDING CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN GLOBAL
BUSINESS 13 (1998).

203.
204.
205.

Richards, supra note 202, at 679.
Id.
"Universalism searches for sameness and similarity and tries to impose on all
&

members of a class or universe the laws of their commonality." CHARLES HAMPDEN-TURNER
FONS TROMPENAARS, BUILDING CROSS-CULTURAL COMPETENCE: How TO CREATE WEALTH FROM
CONFLICTING VALUES 16 (2000).

Richards, supra note 202, at 679. Active efforts by US prosecutors to ferret out and
206.
punish corruption in global soccer have been viewed by some as an example of this predilection.
For instance, Russian President Vladimir Putin has complained of US involvement in the
investigation, and the Russian Foreign Ministry called on Washington to "stop trying to hold
court far beyond your own borders using your own legal norms and (instead) adhere to accepted
international

legal

procedure."

Anna

Arutunyan,

Investigation by US, USA TODAY, May 15, 2015, at 3B.
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United States, tend to believe that they know what is right and often
resort to threats or commands to coerce others to accept that view." 2 0 7
Continued US emphasis on power tactics at the expense of a
freely negotiated, rule-oriented path does not bode well for success in
effectively counteracting the climate change threat to the planet. 208
As the US Supreme Court observed over.forty years ago, "[w]e cannot
have trade and commerce in world markets .

.

. exclusively on our

terms." 209 However, changing this orientation will not prove easy. It
may entail a retooling of the US governmental system to provide the
executive branch with greater discretion over negotiating solutions to
global problems, as well as a new orientation towards inclusion and
consistency and away from hypocrisy. 210
IV. REFLECTING ON CHINESE TRADE POLICY

China is a newcomer to the global trade game; however, its
impact on trade is unquestionably significant. This section provides a
brief overview of Chinese trade policy and demonstrates opportunities
for, and threats to, Chinese and American cooperation, particularly as
they relate to global trade and sustainability.
A. Accession to the WTO
Accession to the WTO in 2001 gave a significant boost to
China's integration into the global economy. 211 China is now the
world's largest exporter and has the largest GDP measured on a
purchasing power parity basis, 2 12 though the accuracy of its reported
GDP figures has been called into question on numerous occasions. 2 1 3
207.
Richards, supra note 202, at 679. Some cultures "believe that they can and should
control nature by imposing their will upon it. . . . [This orientation is] describe[d] as innerdirected." See TROMPENAARS & HAMPDEN-TURNER, supra note 202, at 141.

208.
Andrew L. Strauss, From Gattzilla to the Green Giant: Winning the Environmental
Battle for the Soul of the World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 769, 797 (1998)
(warning that a heavy-handed US approach will undermine reaching multilateral environmental
accords).
209.
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
210.
See Richards & McCrory, supra note 160, at 338-39.
211.

INT'L MONETARY FUND,

CHINA'S GROWTH AND INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD

ECONOMY
PROSPECTS
AND
CHALLENGES
16
(Eswar
Prasad
ed.,
2004),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/232/op232.pdf [https://perma.cclPMM2-LEUL].
212.
Mike Bird, China Just Overtook the US as the World's Largest Economy, Bus.
INSIDER (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/china-overtakes-us-as-worlds-largesteconomy-2014-10 [https://perma.cc/6QHG-5R86].
213.
INT'L
UNCERTAINTIES

MONETARY
13

FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: LEGACIES, CLOUDS,
(2014),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02

[https://perma.cc/FFY9-BEEW]. Chinese exports reached an all-time high of $2.2 trillion or 27
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Although China's growing presence in world trade and in the WTO
has created some conflict, the fears that China would undermine the
2 14
multilateral trading system have so far proven to be unfounded.
Despite this, there is still a desire, especially in US political circles, to
find problems with China's positions on trade. For example, the US
Trade Representative annually prepares a report on China's WTO
compliance, in which it articulates a laundry list of complaints-from
the number of state-owned enterprises in China to market access
barriers for foreign goods and services. 2 1 5 Yet commentators largely
agree that, on the whole, China has become a more responsible and
useful member of the WTO from 2001 to 2015.216
In order to join the WTO, China had to, and did, revise
"numerous laws, regulations, and other measures affecting trade and
investment." 2 1 7 It "cut tariffs on over 5,000 products resulting in
average tariffs coming down from 43.2 percent in the early 1990s to
2 18
China also created a
9.8 percent after the transitional period."
more than 2,000 laws
the
review
special body to help administer and

percent of Chinese GDP in 2013. Joachim Monkelbaan, Addressing the Trade-Climate-Energy
Nexus: China's Explorations in a Global Governance Landscape, 5 ADVANCES CLIMATE CHANGE
RES. 206, 211 (2014).
HANNS GUNTHER HILPERT, CHINA'S TRADE POLICY DOMINANCE WITHOUT THE WILL
214.
https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents
(2014),
5
LEAD
TO

/products/research-papers/2014_RP01_hlp.pdf [https://perma.cclXW7J-7CMB].
The report is prepared pursuant to section 421 of the US-China Relations Act of
215.
2000, 22 U.S.C. § 6951 (2012), which requires the US Trade Representative to report annually to
Congress on China's compliance with commitments made in connection with its accession to the
WTO. The report also incorporates the findings of the Overseas Compliance Program, as
U.S. TRADE
required by section 413(b)(2) of the Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6943(b)(2) (2012).
REPRESENTATIVE,

2014

REPORT

TO

CONGRESS

ON

CHINA'S WTO

COMPLIANCE

1

(2014),

&

&

[https://perma.cc/39E3https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014-Report-to-Congress-Final.pdf
9WSZ].
Claude Barfield, The DragonStirs: China's Trade Policy for Asia-and the World, 24
216.
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 93, 107 (2007) ("Despite its very recent accession to the WTO, China
has emerged as a leader among WTO developing-country Members in .. . multilateral trade
negotiations."); Kim F. Natividad, Stepping It up and Taking It to the Streets: Changing Civil
Criminal Copyright Enforcement Tactics, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 495-98 (2008) (discussing
China's expanded protection of intellectual property rights since joining the WTO); Julia Ya Qin,
The Predicamentof China's "WTO-Plus" Obligation to Eliminate Export Duties: A Commentary
on the China-Raw Materials Case, 11 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 237, 237-40 (2012); Guobin Zhu
Rohan Price, Chinese Immigration Law and Policy: A Case of "Change Your Direction, or End up
Where You Are Heading'?, 26 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 18 (2013) (discussing China's loosened
immigration and visa restrictions).
217.

U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 215, at 2.

218.

Zhenyu Sun, China's Experience of 10 Years in the WTO, in A DECADE IN THE WTO:

IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA AND

GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE

Christophe Bellmann & Shuaihua Cheng eds., 2011).

11 (Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz,
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and regulations at issue, resulting in the abolition of more than 500 of
rules that were found to be inconsistent with WTO requirements. 2 19
The country-wide push to achieve WTO compliance was
facilitated in a number of ways-from WTO centers that were set up
in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzen, and many other Chinese cities to study
WTO rules and provide training for businesses and governments to
the more than 3,000 books on the WTO and its rules that were
published in 2002.220 The Chinese government even "sponsored a
nationwide contest on WTO knowledge, with more than five million
people participating." 221
The final stage of the contest was
broadcasted on China Central Television, and the winners were sent
to Geneva to celebrate and meet with officials. 222
China's behavior in its early years as a member of the WTO
was relatively benign. 223 For example, in 2006, the United States
threatened to file a complaint against China for duties on kraft
linerboard. In response, China lifted the duties the next work day. 2 2 4
With time, however, "the Chinese have mastered WTO procedures,
including how to defend and proactively use them to protect and
advance their national interests." 225 Currently, they initiate cases and
comply with rulings. 226 As stated by a leading German think tank,
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik:
China behaves like an established actor in the WTO world trade system. It
sometimes breaks rules and grants its own trade interests greater importance than
the existence and stability of the system as a whole, but in general it respects the
status quo and pragmatically pursues its own economic interests. 2 2 7

China has taken impressive steps to implement its WTO
commitments and, as a result, has established itself as an effective
trading partner. 228 However, as China develops its confidence and
219.
"Many other regulations were amended, and if one includes laws and regulations at
the provincial level, the total number of reviewed pieces exceeded 90,000. This was
unprecedented in China's history." Id. at 12.
220.
Id.; see, e.g., Gong Baihua, Shanghai's WTO Affairs Consultation Center: Working
Together to Take Advantage of WTO Membership, WTO, https://www.wto.org/English
/res-efbooksp-e/casestudies-e/caselle.htm [https://perma.cc/C9EV-W8CK] (last visited Mar. 9,
2017).
221.
Sun, supra note 218, at 12.
222.
Id.
223.
All Change, ECONOMIST (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21541448
[https://perma.cc/976C-ZAFW].
224.
Id.
225.
Id.
226.
Id.
227.
HILPERT, supra note 214, at 5-6.
228.
Seung-Youn Oh argued that China's pattern of quick compliance is in fact part of its
strategy to achieve its objectives while appearing to be a good WTO player. SEUNG-YOUN OH,
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strength, criticism of China's protectionist trade policies are only
going to intensify, especially if, like the United States, China's free
trade rhetoric fails to match reality. In this section, the Article
examines complaints the United States has made against China with
regard to WTO compliance to assess China's position as a negotiating
partner, especially when it comes to managing tensions between free
trade and the climate.
B. China's WTO Compliance History
While it seems that China is a relatively consistent trading
partner, the country still draws significant criticism and often
presents a complex problem for its trading partners because of its
level of state intervention. 229 Criticisms related to Chinese trade
policies arise from "export restrictions, subsidies, product standards,
...

customs valuation, trade-related investment measures, . . . and

services regulation." 230 According to World Bank economist, Chad P.
Bown, the United States and other WTO members filed numerous
lawsuits between 2006 and 2008, which suggests "an end to the no
litigation standoff in the initial period following China's 2001
accession." 231 And, in recent years, China seems to be focused on state
capitalism as seen by the auto parts and intellectual property disputes
2 32
discussed below.

The U.S. Trade Representative initiated a WTO case against
China on March 30, 2006 for its discriminatory regulations on
imported auto parts. 233 The purpose of which "was to discourage
CONVENIENT COMPLIANCE: CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL POLICY STAYING ONE STEP AHEAD OF WTO

https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/191745/13.05.2015.pdf
(2015),
1
ENFORCEMENT
[https://perma.cc/9XFL-JPH5]. "By the time China removes the challenged measures, it often no
longer needs them, since it has already achieved its goals and can still build up a reputation as a
responsible WTO member by complying with the organization's rulings." Id.
"Increasingly, trade frictions with China can be traced to China's pursuit of
229.
industrial policies that rely on trade-distorting government actions to promote or protect China's
state-owned enterprises and domestic industries." Overview of US Report to Congress on China's
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov
2011),
13,
(Dec.
DIGITAL
Compliance, IIP
WTO
/st/english/texttrans/2011/12/20111213154713su0.7869335.html [https://perma.cc/473D-XWNM8].
Razeen Sally, Chinese Trade Policy a Decade After WTO Accession, in A DECADE IN
230.
THE WTO: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE 22, 27 (Ricardo Melendez-

Ortiz, Christophe Bellmann & Shuaihua Cheng eds., 2011).
Chad P. Bown, China's WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute
231.
Settlement, in CHINA'S GROWING ROLE IN WORLD TRADE 281, 329 (Robert C. Feenstra & Shang-

Jin Wei eds., 2010).
See infra text accompanying notes 234-40.
232.
233.

WAYNE M.

MORRISON,

CONG.

RESEARCH

SERV., RL33536,

CHINA-US

TRADE

ISSUES 25 (2011), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=l867&context
=key-workplace [https://perma.cc/7NP2-NB45].
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domestic producers from using imported parts and to encourage
foreign firms to move production to China." 234 Ultimately, the WTO
panel ruled on February 13, 2007 that "China's discriminatory tariff
policy was inconsistent with its WTO obligations." 2 35 China appealed
the decision, but it was subsequently upheld and China complied with
the rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body. 2 3 6
Intellectual property protection is another controversial aspect
of China's trade policy. China commited as a part of its accession
agreement to "improve protection of intellectual rights along the lines
required by the Uruguay Round agreement on Trade Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)." 237 But, while legal structures
for intellectual property protection have improved somewhat,
enforcement has left something to be desired. 238 For example, when
General Motors claimed that the Chinese Chery QQ was a copy of its
Chevrolet Spark, it received little help from the Chinese
government. 239
Despite these lapses, China is taking steps to improve its IP
enforcement mechanisms. 240 As Zhenyu Sun from China Society for
World Trade Organization Studies writes:
In the field of enforcement, China's practice is unique in the world. On top of the
judicial procedures that [intellectual property rights] owners may take to protect
their rights, which are similar to those of other countries, China has taken
additional administrative measures to protect IPR, deploying half a million local
staff to monitor and impose punitive fines on offenders. The situation will be

234.
235.

Id.
Id.; see also WTO, CHINA AUTO-PARTS

I

(n.d.), https://www.wto.org/English

/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases-e/lpagesum-e/ds342sum-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/EXU6-AEHE].

236.
237.

MORRISON, supra note 234, at 25.
Rachel McCulloch & Chad P. Bown, US Trade Policy Toward China, in CHALLENGES

TO THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM: ADJUSTMENT TO GLOBALIZATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

&

75 (Sumner La Croix & Peter A. Petri eds., 2007).
238.
Id.
239. General Motors' subsidiary, GM Daewoo Auto & Technology Co. Ltd., filed a lawsuit
against Chery, the Chinese state-owned car producer. The General Counsel for GM Daewoo
stated, "Despite our good faith efforts and the assistance of the Chinese Government in the past
year, Chery has been non-responsive to mediation efforts, and has even stepped up efforts to
export the vehicle to other markets." Gong Zhengzheng, GM Charges Chery for Alleged Mini Car
Piracy, CHINA DAILY (Dec.
18, 2004), http://www.chinadaily.com.cnlenglish/doc/200412/18/content_401235.htm [https://perma.cclRV63-CFW7]. The lawsuit was filed after the State
Intellectual Property office announced that there was insufficient evidence of infringement,
despite the very close appearance of the two cars. Id. See also Other examples include
enforcment of copyrights for film. See Sun, supra note 218, at 35. See also Kristina Sepetys
Alan Cox, Intellectual Property Rights Protection in China: Trends in Litigation and Economic
Damages 1 (2009).

240.

Sun, supra note 218, at 12.
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improved further as more Chinese companies are having their patents 2 and
trademarks registered, and awareness of IPR protection continues to improve. 41

It appears that while compliance is not perfect, China does
work to uphold its obligations as a global trading partner.
C. Is China FlexingIts Muscles?
As China becomes more confident, it has begun challenging US
leadership in global trade in critical ways. "While China has been
important to the world economy for decades, the country is now
wielding its financial heft with the confidence and purpose of a global
superpower." 242 It has been aggressive in its push to "win diplomatic
allies, invest its vast wealth, promote its currency and secure muchneeded natural resources." 243 To implement this strategy, China
launched the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). This
China-backed institution "is seen as a challenge to the World Bank
and Asian Development Bank, both of which count Washington and its
244
The AIIB, viewed as an
allies as their biggest financial backers."
245
is seen in the United
influence,"
its
attempt by China to "extend
States as a direct challenge to the influence the United States and
Europe have wielded over the World Bank and International
246
"Beijing has
Monetary Fund (IMF) for the past sixty years.
the Asian
Bank,
World
the
within
influence
struggled to increase its
the
lender,
Development Bank and the world's emergency
International Monetary Fund. But as the founder and one of the new
bank's largest shareholders, Beijing will have the greatest say in
which projects to pick."24 7

Id.
241.
Clifford Krauss & Keith Bradsher, China's Global Ambitions, With Loans and
242.
2015),
24,
(July
TIMES
N.Y.
Attached,
Strings
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/business/international/chinas-global-ambitions-with-loansand-strings-attached.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8QHS-49B7]. "Even the current stock market
slump is unlikely to shake the country's resolve. China has nearly $4 trillion in foreign currency
reserves, which it is determined to invest overseas to earn a profit and exert its influence." Id.
Id.
243.
Brenda Goh, Three Major Nations Absent as China Launches World Bank Rival in
244.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-aiib2014),
14,
(Oct.
REUTERS
Asia,
aims to give project
idUSKCNOIDO8U20141105 [https://perma.cc/J7WE-V6UJ]. "The AIIB ...
loans to developing nations." Id.
Id.
245.
Bob Davis, China's Vow to Forgo Veto Won Key Backers for Bank, WALL ST. J., Mar.
246.
24, 2015, at A7.
Ian Talley, U.S. Looks to Work with China on Fund, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2015, at
247.
A7.
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Much of the world, especially China, has long complained about
Washington's
inordinate
power over worldwide
investment
decisions. 248 Creation of the AIIB was not only a major coup for
China, 249 but also a tremendous embarrassment for the United
States. 250 Key US allies-the UK, France, Germany, and Italy-were
persuaded to break with the United States and back the China-led
effort after Beijing proposed "that no single country dictate decision
making at the new bank, . . . making a sharp departure from the long-

standing practice at
States, "with little
proposing that the
Washington-backed

US-backed institutional lenders." 251 The United.
leverage over the Chinese-led bank, is now
new entity cooperate in joint projects with
institutions .. .[,] which use US-approved

rules." 252

D. Lessons Learned
China's establishment of the AIIB and its embrace by the
world's key trading nations, despite strong opposition from the United
States, illustrate the changing world in which we live.
They
demonstrate the costs that attend past failures by the United States
to play by international rules, as well as the fact that Washington is
no longer in the position to unilaterally dictate the content of
international law. The question is: does Washington understand this
new paradigm and, if so, will it alter its behavior in order to help
broker new polycentric mechanisms to foster free trade and
sustainable development?
V. ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS DISPUTES: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
NATIONAL INTERESTS AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND
CHINA

China's spectacular economic growth has not been without its
negative externalities. Growth has taken a heavy toll on the Chinese
248.
"The U.S. has had a lock on some big decisions at the IMF despite holding less than
20% of its voting shares, a structure that has drawn complaints from the rest of the world." See
Davis, supra note 249, at A7.
249.
"Infrastructure needs around the world are enormous. Emerging countries need new
ports, railways, bridges, airports and roads to support faster growth . . . . McKinsey & Co.
estimates global infrastructure-investment needs through 2030 total $57 trillion." See Talley,
supra note 250, at A7.
250.
"The US suffered a diplomatic embarrassment ... after several of its key European
allies publicly rebuffed Washington's pleas to snub Beijing's invitation to join the bank and
instead said they would be founding members." Id.
251.
See Davis, supra note 249, at A7.
252.
Id.
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253
In
environment by generating horrendous air and water pollution.
2006, China passed the United States as the world's largest emitter of
greenhouse gases. 254 In response, the Chinese government moved to
increase the amount of electricity generated from renewable sources to
15 percent by 2020.255 As a result, China has become a world leader in
wind turbines and photovoltaics ("PV") cells, and China now leads the
256
It is also estimated that
world in renewable energy investments.
Chinese producers represent approximately 80 percent of the global
solar market. 257
While China's actions toward the environment and its
encouragement of the renewable energy sector appear to be a positive
development, many observers suggest that those actions have
258
prompted a "green energy race" between Washington and Beijing.
This term deliberately invokes the "space race" between the Soviet
Union and the United States which involved milestones in space after
259
The fear is that China will
the the launch of the Sputnik satellite.

253. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that air pollution in China results in
the premature deaths of 656,000 Chinese each year. Gwynne Wiatrowski Guzzeau, Indoor Air
Pollution: Energy Problems in China's Residential Sector, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 444
(1999) ("With more than 352 million people living in urban areas, China's cities have two to five
times the World Health Organization's standards for concentrations of air pollutants, far
exceeding China's own standards."); Joseph McMullin, Do Chinese Environmental Laws Work? A
Study of Litigation as a Response to the Problem of Fishery Pollution in China, 26 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 142, 146 (2009) ("More than half of the rivers in China are too polluted to serve as a
source of drinking water, and seventy percent of the water in five of China's seven major river
systems has been deemed unsuitable for human contact."); Kevin Holden Platt, Chinese Air
Pollution Deadliest in World, Report Says, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (July 9, 2007),
http://news.nationalgeographic.comnews/2007/07/070709-china-pollution.html
[https://perma.ccl9HAF-T4S7].
Brad Knickerbocker, China Now World's Biggest Greenhouse Gas Emitter,
254.
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 28, 2007), http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0628/pl2sOl-wogi.html
[https://perma.cclU8FF-TTBL].
Joel B. Eisen, China's Greentech Programs and the USTR Investigation, 11
255.
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 3, 3 (2011); Kat Cheung, Integration of Renewables: Status and

2011),
Paper,
Working
Agency,
Energy
(Int'l
7-8
China
in
Challenges
http:www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publicationlintegration-of-renewables.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FN22-UEUP]. Installed renewable electricity capacity was essentially nonexistent in 2005, but has doubled every year since. Id. at 8.
See Pilita Clark, China Heads Renewable Energy Spending, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 15,
256.
2013, at 17.
Jonathan Stearns, EU Solar-Panel Industry Loses Bid to Revamp China Pact, 33
257.
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 69 (Jan. 14, 2016).
Joel B. Eisen, The New Energy Geopolitics?: China, Renewable Energy, and the
258.
"GreentechRace," 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 9, 10-11 (2011).
Id.
259.
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dominate the global market for renewables and greentech, 260 which
could potentially hurt US firms' ability to compete for this vital
twenty-first century market. 261 Furthermore, to some, ""losing" the
race and falling behind the Chinese" will have serious consequences
for national economic security. 262 Even senior military leaders lament
that the United States is jeopardizing its future by not taking
appropriate steps to address the "dire situation presented by climate
change." 263 In this view, failing to transition to a clean energy
economy will "leave the United States vulnerable to ceding its position
as a major world power." 264 As a result, trade policies involving
greentech are ideal candidates for protectionist agendas, despite the
need for cooperative behavior. This section provides a comparative
case study on trade disputes related to greentech as a vehicle for
highlighting how nations are balancing the push for free trade and
sustainable development.
A. Shining a Light on the Solar Panel Trade War
The tension between encouraging national environmental
policies and the removal of protectionists trade barriers are not new,
as seen in the Tuna and Shrimp cases discussed in Part 11.265
However, the green energy race differs slightly because countries are
using traditional industrial policy instruments (sector-targeted
subsidies, local-content subsidies, and export restrictions) "to spur the
development of renewable energy and environmentally friendly
industries."266
Despite pre-Paris conference comments by the Obama
Administration that "the [United States] hopes that leading by
260.
For the purposes of this article, "greentech" refers to renewable energy technologies
such as solar and wind power. See Neal Dikeman, What Is Clean Tech?, CNET (Aug. 11, 2008,
9:17 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/what-is-clean-tech/ [https://perma.cclK7WD-RPYY].
261.
See Eisen, supra note 258, at 10-11 ("Many observers state that we are doing less
than the Chinese to promote renewables and that we are in a competition with China. . . . Some
fear that China will dominate the global market for greentech, exporting it to us and diminishing
American companies' ability to compete with Chinese firms."). These fears have not materialized.
In 2015, the solar energy industry grew nearly twelve times faster than the overall US economy.
Julian Spector, Solar Jobs Are Outpacing the US Economy by a Longshot, CITYLAB (Jan. 14,
2016),
http://www.citylab.com/work/2016/01/solar-job-growth-american-economy-marcorubio/424035/ [https://perma.cc/NR7K-XF2RJ.
262.
Eisen, supranote 258, at 3.
263.
Id.
264.
Id.
265.
Mark Wu & James Salzman, The Next Generation of Trade and Environment
Conflicts: The Rise of Green IndustrialPolicy, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. 401, 404 (2014); See also supra
notes 153-62 & 176-86 and accompanying text.
266.
Id.
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example will put it in a stronger position to negotiate international
reductions at the Paris climate conference . . . and build on bilateral
talks with China," 2 6 7 recent trade actions by the country give such
rhetoric a hollow ring. At the same time that the Administration has
promised in its Clean Power Plan to "[give] a head start to wind and
solar deployment . . . by executive actions to scale up investment in
clean energy innovation," 2 6 8 it has imposed crippling tariffs on imports
of environmentally friendly products from China and other trade
partners. For instance, Chinese production of cheap solar panels
substantially reduced global prices and triggered a boom in the solar
269
Since 2012, the US
industry, even as it hurt US PV producers.
anti-subsidy laws,
and
US
antidumping
Commerce Department, using
of the US
several
forcing
has levied steep tariffs on the imports,
27 0
As we will see, this has
importing companies out of business.
caused China to retaliate, resulting in a trade war in which the
competing priorities of free trade and sustainable development come
into stark relief.
In late 2011, a group of US solar companies (led by SolarWorld
Industries) filed a petition ("the Petition") with the United States
International Trade Commission (USITC) and the US Department of
Commerce ("Commerce"), claiming that the Chinese Government's is
unfairly subsidizing renewables by "providing land, electricity,
material inputs, and financing below-market rates, as well as direct

Dan Roberts, White House Insists Tough New Carbon Restrictions Are Legal Under
267.
AM),
4:29
2015,
3,
(Aug.
GUARDIAN
Act,
Air
Clean
20
15/aug/02/obama-white-house-emissionss-cuts-cleanhttp://www.theguardian.com/environment/
air-act [https://perma.cclE2PC-KQV2] (commenting on President Obama's goal of reducing
carbon dioxide emissions from US power plants).
Fact Sheet: President Obama to Announce Historic Carbon Pollution Standards for
268.
Power Plants, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 3, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/20 15/08/03/fact-sheet-president-obama-announce-historic-carbon-pollution-standards
[https://perma.cc/GSX4-H8QU].
Zachary Scott Simmons, Subsidizing Solar: The Case for an Environmental Goods
269.
and Services Carve-Out from the Global Subsidies Regime, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 422,
447 (2014); David P. Vincent, The Global Cost of Green: Recent Trade Issues and Litigation
Between the United States and China May Dissolve Global Green Cooperation, 39 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 141, 148 (2014); Kate Fehrenbacher, China Is Utterly and Totally
AM),
11:41
2015,
18,
(June
FORTUNE
Panels,
Solar
Dominating
http://fortune.com/2015/06/18/china-is-utterly-and-totally-dominating-solar-panels/
[https://perma.cc/E82J-JAUTV].
Mark Melnicoe, China Mostly Quiet on Upholding of High Tariffs on Solar Panel
270.
Exports, 32 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1280 (July 16, 2015). This action "has been
criticized by some environmentalists . . . who note the desirability of low-priced panels in the
solar industry, which despite decades of promise had remained a technology priced too high to
compete with conventional forms of power generation." Id.
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financial support and preferential policies."2 7 1 China's subsidies, the
Petition claimed, were designed to give China an unfair advantage (as
opposed to assist a nacent domestic industry, which is an acceptable
form of anticompetitive behavior). 272 China, however, maintained that
its lower prices on PV panels "are due to . . . China's comparative
advantages in manufacturing," paired with its "excess capacity and.
market induced inventory clearing." 273
The companies asked Commerce to "levy tariffs on solar cells
and modules" coming from China. 274 The USITC ruled preliminarily
in the petitioners' favor and Commerce announced in March 2012 that
it would enact preliminary tariffs of 2.90 percent to 4.73 percent
against Chinese solar panel manufacturers. 2 7 5
China presumably
unphased by the low amounts, did not respond harshly to the
measure. 276
However, two months after Commerce's initial
announcement, the Department of Commerce stated that it would
impose an antidumping duty on Chinese solar panel manufacturers of
approximately 31 percent to 100 to 250 percent. 277 The increase made
the duties "among the largest ever levied against a product through a
unilateral tariff and increased the cost of solar panels significantly." 2 7 8

271.
Melanie Hart, Shining a Light on U.S.-China Clean Energy Cooperation, CTR. AM.
PROGRESS
(Feb.
9,
2012,
9:00
AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2012/2/09/11030/shining-a-light-on-us-china-clean-energy-cooperationi/ [https://perma.cc/ENN4-LL23].
272.
Id.
273.
Id. 'The market for solar panel manufacturing slowed down significantly in 2011,
which Chinese firms claimed caused an excess amount of products, forcing manufacturers to sell

at very low prices to clear out inventory." Vincent, supra note 272, at 155.
274.
Hart, supra note 274.
275.
Wu & Salzman, supra note 268, at 437 (citing Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells,
Whether or Not Assembled into Modules, from the People's Republic of China: Preliminary
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,439, 17,456 (Mar. 26, 2012)).
276.
Wu & Salzman, supra note 268, at 438. See also Keith Bradsher & Matthew L. Wald,
A Measured Rebuttal to China, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2012, at Bl; Suntech Power Holdings Co.,
Suntech Response to PreliminaryDecision on CVD Tariffs in the Subsidy Investigation on PV
Cells from China, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.prnewswire.cominewsreleases/suntech-response-to-preliminary-decision-on-cvd-tariffs-in-the-subsidy-investigation-onpv-cells-from-china-143531726.html [https://perma.cclKT66-G2TY] (discussing Chinese solar cell
importer Suntech's reaction to the preliminary decision).
277.
Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into Modules, from
the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value,
Postponement of Final Determination and Affirmative Preliminary Determination of Critical
Circumstances, 77 Fed. Reg. 31,309, 31,312, 31,321-23 (May 25, 2012); see also Keith Bradsher
& Diane Cardwell, Chinese Solar Panels Face Big Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2012, at Bl;
Obama's Tariffs on China's Solar Products Will Cost U.S., BLOOMBERGVIEW (May 15, 2012, 7:00
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2012- 05-15/obama-s-tariffs-on-china-s-solarproducts-will-cost-u-s-.
278.
Wu & Salzman, supra note 268, at 438.
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China criticized the duties and argued that they indicated a
Beijing further
concerning level of US trade protectionism. 27 9
responded in May 2012 by filing its own WTO dispute against the
United States, which it eventually won. 2 8 0 In July 2012, it also
launched its own antidumping investigation into United States and
South Korean imports to China of polysilicon, the main ingredient
used in solar cells. 2 8 1 This investigation resulted in tariffs "as high as
57 percent for US polysilicon and 48.7 percent for South Korean
polysilicon." 282
In December 2013, SolarWorld brought a second set of
antidumping and anti-subsidy complaints against China and
Taiwan. 283 It claimed that this was to close a loophole in the outcome
of the first trade case. The loophole allowed Chinese producers to
import modules assembled in China from cells manufactured in other
countries, notably Taiwan. 284 In June and July 2014, Commerce set
preliminary tariffs based on affirmative countervailing subsidy and
anti-dumping investigations respectively. 2 85 The United States thus

Head of MOFCOMBureau of Fair Trade for Imports and Exports Comments on U.S.
279.
Preliminary Ruling of Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Investigation Against Imports of Solar
Panels

from

China,

MINISTRY

COM.

PEOPLE'S

REPUBLIC

CHINA

(Dec.

6,

2011),

2

http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/policyreleasing/ 01112/20111207864408.shtml
[https://perma.cc/QD6Y-F4AN].
See David Lawder, China Complains to WTO That U.S. Fails to Implement Tariff
280.
Ruling, REUTERS (May 13, 2016, 7:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-tradeidUSKCNOY420C [https://perma.cc/C9DJ-QRDM]; Tom Miles, Chinese WTO Suit Strikes Back
at U.S. Duties, REUTERS (May 25, 2012, 8:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usatrade-idUSBRE84017D20120526 [https://perma.cc/9FFH-TAN7].
Wu & Salzman, supra note 268, at 439 (citing Leslie Hook, China Launches Anti281.
2012),
20,
(July
TIMES
FIN.
U.S.,
Against
Probe
Dumping
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3623df3a-d254-liel-abe7-00144feabdcO.html#axzz2dwN6FgbO
[https://perma.cc/6XQQ-KLTD]).
Wu & Salzman, supra note 268, at 439 (citing Wayne Ma, China Aims Duties at the
282.
US, South Korea, WALL ST. J. (Asia ed.), July 19-21, 2013, at 17).
Edgar Meza, SEIA Blasts SolarWorld Legal Action, Calls for Peaceful Resolution to
283.
US-China Trade Dispute, PV MAG. (Jan. 6, 2014), https://www.pv-magazine.com/2014/01/06/seiablasts-solarworld-legal-action-calls-for-peaceful-resolution-to-us-china-tradedispute_100013822/#axzz3xJUyNRDy [https://perma.cc/L745-8HHA].
One Year After Winning Trade Ruling, SolarWorld Works to Finish Job of Restoring
284.
US Competition, SOLARWORLD (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.solarworld-usa.com/newsroom/news-

releases/news/2013/solarworld-works-to-restore-us-competition [https://perma.cc/ZY5Y-GSJQ].
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., FACT SHEET: COMMERCE
COUNTERVAILABLE SUBSIDIZATION OF IMPORTS OF CERTAIN CRYSTALLINE
FINDS
PRELIMINARILY
SILICON PHOTOVOLTAIC PRODUCTS FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (2014),
285.

U.S.

http://enforcement.trade.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-prc-crystalline-silicon-photovoltaicprod-cvd-prelim-060314.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z68V-2YJX]; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INT'L
TRADE ADMIN., FACT SHEET: COMMERCE PRELIMINARILY FINDS DUMPING OF IMPORTS OF CERTAIN
CRYSTALLINE SILICON PHOTOVOLTAIC PRODUCTS FROM CHINA AND TAIWAN 1 (2014),
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expanded the tariffs resulting from the first set of cases and
broadened the scope of the duties to any modules that undergo final
assembly in China, regardless of manufacturing origin. Experts saw
this as an unprecedented move. 2 86 Paula Stern, former chairwoman of
the International Trade Commission (ITC), sums up that sentiment:
"Trade spats featuring the [United States] and China are nothing
new, nor is the battle over government subsidies to Chinese solar
manufacturers. What is new is the Commerce Department's move to
change the rules in the middle of the game, hurting the domestic solar
industry, undermining [United States] climate change goals, and
risking a prolonged trade dispute at the WTO." 2 8 7

US attacks on Chinese subsidization of its exports are certainly
suspect. 2 88 The antisubsidy laws that are used to stifle imports from

the solar industry can easily be viewed as skewed in favor of
protecting the domestic economic environment. For instance, in order
to be subject to offsetting tariffs, the ITC must find that the dumped
or subsidized imports cause or threaten to cause material harm to a
domestic industry.
Under the ITC statute, when the six ITC
Commissioners are evenly divided on that issue, a finding of such
harm will be declared. 289 Thus, in a 2015 case, the US Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld antidumping duties and
countervailing duties against utility scale wind towers from China
despite the fact that three of the six Commissioners found there to be
neither material injury nor a threat of such harm. 290 In any event,
http://enforcement.trade.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-multiple-solar-products-ad-prelim072514.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJ6P-ARHM].
286.
A
Benighted Policy on Solar Panels, FIN. TIMES
(July 5, 2014),
https://www.ft.com/content/067751a0-ecbe-11e3-8963-00144feabdcO
[https://perma.cc/36N8S2J4].
287.
Paula Stern, Still Time to Avoid Collateral Damage in U.S.-China Solar Trade
Dispute, HILL (Dec. 5, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreignpolicy/ 2 2 6 044-still-time-to-avoid-collateral-damage-in-us-china-solar
[https://perma.cc/XAD9RTQT].
288.
See Bryce Baschuk, U.S. Under Fire for WTO Case Against Indian Solar Program,
32 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1531 (Sept. 10, 2015) ("International environmental groups
[have] sharply criticized the Obama administration for its World Trade Organization challenge
of India's federal solar energy program."). At the same time that President Obama has urged the
rest of the world to invest in renewable energy sources like solar panels, and promised $24
million in funding for eleven projects in seven states to develop new domestic solar technologies,
it has relied on international trade rules to attack an Indian solar energy program that contains
a domestic sourcing requirement. See id.
289.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(11) (2012).
290.
See Siemens Energy v. United States, 806 F.3d 1367, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2015). This
case was even more interesting "because the divided vote was not a simple three-to-three split on
the question of material injury to the domestic industry; instead, two Commissioners found
present material injury and one Commissioner found threat of material injury, while three
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rules and enforcement actions like this are not likely to assure China
and other trade partners of this country's real commitment to either
international trade law or climate change promises.
B. The Path Forward
The literature on polycentric governance-as well as the
leading models that have been designed to effectuate it-demonstrate
the utility of bottom-up governance, including minilateralism in
addressing global collective action problems, be they in the trade or
sustainable development contexts. 291 Defined classically as "a system
292
minilateralism
of governance through great power collaboration,"
holds the potential to "strengthen an increasingly polycentric field of
global governance. It can inject political momentum into gridlocked
international processes, provide new forms of collective leadership in a
post-hegemonic world, and reconcile existing multilateral regimes
with shifts in the global power balance." 293 Throughout this Article,
we have assessed the threats to minilateralism-focusing on the G2to better understand the potential for polycentric governance in the
free trade and sustainable development contexts. This final section
brings this analysis together, complete with translated implications
for policymakers and managers.
As one example of G2 minilateralism, a US-China BIT with
strong environmental measures could be a key building block to the
formulation of a global sustainable development regime based on a
polycentric governance model. The WTO Director-General himself has
recognized that minilateral agreements and multilateral pacts can be
Further, the pressing nature of global
mutually reinforcing. 294
environmental degradation, coupled with the relative inability of
Commissioners found that there was neither material injury nor threat of material injury." Id. at
1369.
See Robert Falkner, A Minilateral Solution for Global Climate Change? On
291.
Bargaining Efficiency, Club Benefits and International Legitimacy 27 (Ctr. for Climate Change
Econ. and Pol'y, Working Paper No. 222, 2015), http://www.lse.ac.uk/Granthamlnstitute/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07fWorkingPaper_197_Falkner.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4JW-HNZF].
Id. at 5 (quoting Miles Kahler, Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers, in
292.
MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY AND PRAXIS OF AN INSTITUTIONAL FORM 295, 304

(John G. Ruggie ed., 1993)).
Id. at 27.
293.
Roberto Azevbdo, Director-General, World Trade Organization, Address at the
294.
2015),
28,
(Sept.
Switzerland
Geneva,
in
Institute
Graduate
("The
[https://perma.cc/5CSK-66QR]
https://www.wto.org/english/news-e/spra-elspra82_e.htm
multilateral trading system has always coexisted with regional agreements-and proved to be
mutually reinforcing. Rules and standards have been negotiated outside the GATT or the WTO
before. What is important is that the multilateral system periodically updates itself,
harmonizing and sometimes improving the outcomes reached in other negotiating fora.").
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domestic regulation 29 5 and existing international institutions to
combat its effects, 296 calls for committed and creative governance
solutions. The effective action problems inherent in climate change
regulation 2 9 7 require both public and private actors competing and
collaborating with one another if they are to be offset. Polycentric
governance provides this multi-stakeholder conceptual clarity. 2 9 8
Simultaneously, the United States and its governmental
institutions must begin to recognize how their cultural biases will
undermine their ability to address global problems if minilateral
governance in the G2, and more broadly, are to be effective as major
components of a polycentric approach to fostering free trade and
sustainability. This is particularly important in US interactions with
295.
Stephen Kim Park & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, A Firm-DrivenApproach to Global
Governance and Sustainability, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 255, 261-62 (2015).
On a domestic level, environmental problems may be addressed through government
regulation based on legal compliance or market-based legal incentives. Regulation
based on legal compliance seeks to directly control environmental harms through
command-and-control rules promulgated by administrative agencies, which establish
performance
standards or technology-based
controls on pollution-causing
activities . . . . Regulation based on market-based legal incentives seeks to indirectly
control
environmental
harms
by commoditizing
negative
environmental
externalities (e.g., pollution) in order to create and manage market-based
transactions. . . . Importantly, both of these forms of governance are premised on the
effectiveness of legal rules to impel certain desired corporate conduct and the capacity
of governmental regulators to carry out rulemaking, oversight, and enforcement
powers vis-A-vis regulated market participants.
Id.
296.

Id. at 262.

Environmental degradation, however, does not stop at national borders and therefore
requires global solutions. Accordingly, a wide range of international and regional
treaties and other agreements that seek to address environmental issues on a crossborder scale have been signed in the past forty years... . Despite this proliferation of
international environmental conventions, the continued and worsening degradation of
the environment along numerous indicators places into question the effectiveness of
international environmental law.

Id.
297.
Id. at 266. Such collective action problems stem from "the uneven distribution of
harms resulting from climate change across the globe and vastly different time horizons and
discount rates between most developed countries and developing countries like China." Id.
298.
Id. at 268-69.
[Plolycentric governance ...
is based on a collective array of overlapping,
nonhierarchical regulatory actors. These regulatory actors-including state and
nonstate actors operating at various jurisdictional levels-operate independently
within their respective domains. . . . To address the collective action problems that
hinder responses to climate change, polycentric governance relies on experimental
efforts at multiple levels that both compete and collaborate with each other through
"information networks and monitoring at all levels."

Id.
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China because on each of the cultural dimensions discussed aboveindividualism, universalism, and inner direction-Chinese culture is
299 Until
on the opposite end of the spectrum from the United States.
the United States recognizes its cultural orientation and learns to
reconcile its cultural biases with those of China and the rest of the
world, significant agreement on climate change and other global
issues will remain elusive. 300
The ineffectiveness of attempts to find solutions to global
As Fons
problems might spur this need for cultural change.
Trompenaars said, "Changes in culture happen because people realize
301 In
that certain old ways of doing things do not work anymore."
particular, with regards to US-Chinese attempts to mitigate global
crises like climate change, the two countries share a cultural trait that
will be helpful in bridging their differences: "[B]oth societies exhibit a
That shared cultural
great deal of comfort with ambiguity.
navigate their crossthey
as
well
them
serve
predisposition should
302
cultural differences."
If the world is going to mitigate and adapt to a changing
climate, it is essential that the United States and China jointly lead
the way. As former US President Barack Obama announced at a 2014
UN Climate Summit, "the [United States] and China have a special
responsibility as the largest carbon-dioxide emitters to lead a new

See generally Richards, supra note 202, at 679-80. As a collectivist-rather than
299.
individualist society-the Chinese have distaste for confrontational tactics and a preference for
harmony. See id. at 679. In contrast to the American culture's universalist nature, China is
largely a particularist society and therefore rejects the principle that one size fits all. See id.
Finally, the Chinese tend to be outer-directed. See id. at 680. This means that they do not
respond well to threats, believing instead that we are all part of nature and should accommodate
one another's needs. See id. In one manifestation of this lower key approach to gaining its
objectives, Beijing recently established its first think-tank within the Washington beltway in an
attempt to "enhance China's 'soft power'-the ability to further its interests through culture,
media and academia." Jeremy Page, China Takes Island Dispute to US, WALL ST. J. (Asia ed.),
May 4, 2015, at 1. The hope is that the think-tank will "provide a platform for Chinese scholars
and officials to try to influence US public debate on policy-making." Id.
See Richards, supra note 202, at 682. "Understanding the importance of recognizing
300.
cultural differences is only half of the battle. First, one must actually discover those value
distinctions. Yet, the most powerful values that define our culture are acquired so early in our
lives that they might not be directly observable by others. In fact, they frequently remain
unconscious to members of the very society that exhibits them. Very often, they are merely
inferred from the way in which people behave under various circumstances." Id. at 678-79 (citing
GEERT HOFSTEDE & GERT JAN HOFSTEDE, CULTURE AND ORGANIZATION: SOFTWARE OF THE MIND

10 (2d ed. 2005)).
301.

See FONs TROMPENAARS,

RIDING THE WAVES OF CULTURE 23 (Irwin Publishing

1994).

302.

See Richards, supra note 202, at 684.
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effort to curb emissions." 303 Beijing responded by pledging that it
would "make an even greater effort to address climate change and
take on international responsibilities that are commensurate with [its]
national conditions." 304
A key to success, however, will be the
willingness and ability of the two great powers to achieve cooperative
solutions.
After all, as Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong said,
"[c]onfrontation is a negative-sum game in which both sides will pay
heavy prices and the whole world will suffer too." 3 0 5
Ultimately, the United States and China must lead the way "in
imposing a price on carbon, because only that will take to scale the
already significant technology breakthroughs that have happened
with wind, solar, batteries, energy efficiency[,] and nuclear power." 3 0 6
While this will not be easy,30 7 recent events suggest that it is possible.
For instance, in December 2015, fifty-three WTO members, including
the United States and China, agreed on a timetable for the
elimination of tariffs on an expanded list of information technology
products (valued at more than $1.3 trillion per year) over a three-year
period. 308 Because of the most-favored-nation principle, the tariff
reductions brought about by this Information Technology Agreement

303.
William Mauldin & Jeffrey Sparshott, Obama Promises a Push to Cut Emissions,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2014, at A4.
304.
Id. These words seemed sincere as evidenced by the fact that "half of China's new
electricity-generation equipment [the previous] year was renewable." Id.
305.
Felicia Swartz & Ian Talley, U.S. Bluntly Warns China About Cybersecurity, WALL
ST. J., June 24, 2015, at A14 (quoting Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong who was admonishing
the United States for taking a combative tone in the context of tensions over cyberspace and
maritime security).
306.
Thomas L. Friedman, Paris Climate Accord Is a Big, Big Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2015, at A35.
[L]everaging the Paris consensus to get a price on carbon in the big emitting countries
is the 'Holy Grail,' the thing that tips everything. Because while renewables can win
against new fossil fuel plants, old fossil fuel plants built without any pollution
controls, and with all their capital expense amortized and still enjoying subsidies, can
still run very cheaply-if you don't count their massive carbon impacts.
Id.
307.
Amy Harder, Senate Takes a Stand Against Obama CarbonRules, WALL ST. J., Nov.
18, 2015, at A5. Two weeks before the climate change conference in Paris, the US Senate voted to
repeal regulations designed to cut carbon emissions from power plants. Id. This occurred in spite
of the fact that there were not sufficient votes to override a presidential veto. Id. It has been
observed that: "Congressional Republicans nonetheless hope[d] to send a symbolic message
sowing doubt among other nations that Mr. Obama will be able to take decisive steps to address
the issue of climate change." Id.
308.
WTO Members Conclude Landmark $1.3 Trillion IT Trade Deal, WORLD TRADE ORG.
(Dec.
16,
2015),
https://www.wto.org/english/news-e/newsl5_e/ita_16decl5_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/3FCE-QLEL]. The original Information Technology Agreement was created in
1996. Id.
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30 9
thereby
(ITA) will benefit exporters from all 162 WTO members,
stimulating the sale of information technology products around the
world.
Following the template of the ITA, the United States and
China are key participants in negotiations for an Environmental
310 The US
Goods Agreement (EGA) by seventeen WTO members.
Trade Representative described the EGA as a measure that will spur
"innovation in green technologies." 311 The benefits of cutting tariffs on
green goods have been lauded by WTO Director-General Roberto

Azevedo, who observed: "The challenge is . . . to ensure that trade is
an ally in the fight against climate change . . . . We need to create a

virtuous circle of trade and environmental policies which promote
sustainable production and consumption while being pro- growth and
development."

3 12

As with the ITA, the benefits of a completed EGA theoretically
313
However, US trade
would be shared by all WTO members.
that rhetoric
whether
partners, including China, might well question
will match reality. After all, the United States has already been
accused of using its antidumping and countervailing duty laws as a
ruse to raise tariffs on imports after its trade partners have opened
their markets to US goods. 314 A careful reading of the Trade
Representative's comments regarding the EGA does little to quiet this
concern, as it primarily applauds the initiative as a means of
3 15
facilitating the export of American-made, environmental goods.

Most-favored-nation treatment "requires that any privilege, advantage, or benefit
309.
from one WTO member be extended to imports of similar products from all
imports
to
granted
other WTO members." See RICHARDS & SHACKELFORD, supra note 82, at 141.

Bryce Baschuk, EGA Negotiators Await Further Clarity from China on Product
310.
Scope, 32 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1377-78 (Aug. 6, 2015).
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
OFFICE U.S.
Environmental Goods Agreement,
311.
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/other-initiatives/environmental-goods-agreement

[https://perma.cc/9UTWB-5BLV (last visited Feb. 12, 2017).
Bryce Baschuk, WTO Chief Azevedo Says Trade Accords Can Curb Climate Change,
312.
32 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 2050 (Nov. 26, 2015). "A successful EGA accord would help
increase access to cutting-edge technologies at much lower costs while also 'stimulating
innovation and strengthening the green economy around the world,' Azevedo wrote." Id. at 2051.
313.

See RICHARDS & SHACKELFORD, supra note 82.

See supra text accompanying notes 158-60.
314.
See Environmental Goods Agreement, supra note 314 (highlighting the possibility
315.
could "unlock[] opportunities for U.S. exporters"). Unfortunately, as of December
EGA
the
that
2016, these talks were stalled. Bryce Baschuk, Environmental Trade Talks Collapse over Product
List Discord, 33 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 1723 (Dec. 8, 2016).
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VI. CONCLUSION

For the United States, the economic benefit of free trade pacts
is estimated by the White House to be more than $1 trillion, with the
value of the proposed TPP project alone projected to be more than
$300 billion.3 16 Appraisals of the economic benefit of a healthy,
sustainable global ecosystem are more complicated to calculate, but
those that have tried, such as the World Bank, have placed the figure
in the trillions. 3 17 Similarly, the cost of forces disrupting these public
goods such as trade disputes and climate change is incredibly high-a
US-China trade war could cost tens of billions of dollars
cumulatively, 3 18 while climate change has already been estimated to
impact the global economy to the tune of some $1.2 trillion annually,
which works out to roughly 1.6 percent of global GDP. 319
Furthermore, the price tag of delaying action to stem climate change
has been estimated at almost 1 percent-which, in the United States
alone, would come to more than $150 billion annually. 320 In other
words, the stakes are high, as are the opportunities in both free trade
and sustainable development. To date, Donald Trump has signaled
his intention to move away from multilateral trade deals and favor
bilateral and minilateral accords, which could accelerate the trend
toward polycentric governance in these fields. 321

316.

See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF US TRADE 5, 45

(2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/does/ceatrade-report
final-nonembargoed v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NLP-YJT7].
317.
See, e.g., New Study Adds up the Benefits of Climate-Smart Development in Lives,
Jobs,
and
GDP,
WORLD
BANK
(June
23,
2014),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/06/23/study-adds-up-benefits-cimate-smartdevelopment-lives-jobs-gdp [https://perma.cc/PD4E-EBRS] (estimating that changes in policies
including regulations and taxes, improved industrial energy efficiency, and more energy efficient
buildings and appliances could result in GDP growth of $1.8-$2.6 trillion per year by 2030).
318.
See MORRISON, supra note 234, at i ("U.S.-China economic ties have expanded
substantially over the past three decades. Total U.S.-China trade rose from $2 billion in 1979
(when economic reforms began) to $599 billion in 2015.").
319.
See Fiona Harvey, Climate Change Is Already Damaging Global Economy, Report
Finds,
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
25,
2012,
11:00
PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/sep/26/climate-change-damaging-global-economy
[https://perma.cclBG3Q-N45M].
320.
CLIMATE

See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE COST OF DELAYING ACTION TO STEM
CHANGE
2
(2014),

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/the-cost-of-dtlaying-action to ste
m-climate-change.pdf [https://perma.cc/65KA-XNB9].
321.
See Nicky Woolf, Justin McCurry & Benjamin Haas, Trump to Withdraw from
Trans-Pacific Partnership on First Day in Office, GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2016, 5:01 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/21/donald-trump-100-days-plans-video-transpacific-partnership-withdraw [https://perma.cc/E9XT-KDQU].
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The US and China are the two largest and most influential
economies in the world. Their economic performance and policies will
go far to determine the prosperity and stability of the global economy
and environment. The relationship between them, and their ability to
work together, will play a vital role in determining both the shortterm and longer-run shape and sustainability of the world economy.
By heeding the lessons of effective minilateralism as shown in the
polycentric framework-from graduated sanctions to trust-building
measures such as monitoring-in both the free trade and
sustainability contexts, the G2 can help usher in a more balanced
approach to sustainability that includes both environmental
protection and economic development. This should begin with the USChina BIT and extend to other areas of cooperation, including
intellectual property rights to help greentech flourish; only then will
rhetoric match reality in the United States and China, hopefully
saving seven billion humans in the process.

